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Outsourcing Immigration Compliance

Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown

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Cover Page Footnote

Reginald F. Lewis Fellow, Harvard Law School; Schwartz Fellow, New America Foundation; Former Chairman of the Jamaica Trade Board; Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Patricia Wald (ret.), U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Keith Ellison, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas; J.D., Yale (1999); M.Phil. Politics, Oxford (1997) (Rhodes Scholar). The genesis of this Article was a conversation with a guest worker who drew an analogy between group accountability in the guest worker program that is the subject of this study and microlending in programs modeled on the Nobel Prize-winning Grameen Bank. This work was supported by a grant from the Reginald Lewis Foundation at Harvard Law School. I also benefited from several workshops including ones at the Harvard Business School and the Harvard Department of Sociology. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Randall Kennedy, Reva Siegel, and Martha Minow for their ongoing support of my work in this area. Orlando Patterson, Mary Waters, Dani Rodrik, David Wilkins, Duncan Kennedy, Lani Guinier, Cristina Rodriguez, Tino Cuellar, Kevin Davis, Katrina Wyman, Joshua Fischman, Karen Brown, Alex Raskolnikov, Kevin Johnson, Charles Ogletree, Ken Mack, Steve Legomsky, David Abraham, Martha Mahoney, Kimani Paul-Emile, Ian Ayres, Brad Snyder, Lior Strahilevitz, Devon Carbado, Jim Greiner, Michael Froomkin, Adam Cox, Anne Alstott, Jennifer Gordon, Peter Schuck, Richard Brooks, Ryan Goodman, Gerald Neuman, Peter Henry, Lant Pritchett, Dillon Alleyne, Neville Lewis, Tony Harriott, Richard Bernal, Howard Chang, and Nealia Khan of the Harvard Statistical Consulting Service provided helpful comments. I am indebted to the CARICOM Ministries of Labour and faculty at the University of the West Indies for making themselves available for interviews on ongoing research. I am similarly grateful to Kerry Preibisch, David Griffith, Heather Gibbs, other researchers affiliated with the North South Institute (Ottawa, Canada) and the Canadian High Commission. Nicardo Neil, Anneke Hamilton, and Densil Reid offered excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.

ARTICLES

OUTSOURCING IMMIGRATION COMPLIANCE

*Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown**

Immigration is a hot-button issue about which Americans have sent a clear message. They prefer not to admit more aliens until the government is able to screen credibly for entrants who will abide by the terms of admission and sanction those who do not. While immigration debates now focus almost entirely on undocumented workers, they have overshadowed another critical, yet poorly understood, challenge: designing institutions to screen properly for aliens who are visa-compliant and sanction noncompliant aliens. Because failed guest worker programs unquestionably increase the size of the undocumented population, this Article addresses the difficulty of institutional design by analyzing the highly controversial guest worker provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This Article presents original data from a study of visa-compliance decisions of Jamaicans who work in Canada under a program

* Reginald F. Lewis Fellow, Harvard Law School; Schwartz Fellow, New America Foundation; Former Chairman of the Jamaica Trade Board; Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Patricia Wald (ret.), U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Keith Ellison, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas; J.D., Yale (1999); M.Phil. Politics, Oxford (1997) (Rhodes Scholar). The genesis of this Article was a conversation with a guest worker who drew an analogy between group accountability in the guest worker program that is the subject of this study and microlending in programs modeled on the Nobel Prize-winning Grameen Bank. This work was supported by a grant from the Reginald Lewis Foundation at Harvard Law School. I also benefited from several workshops including ones at the Harvard Business School and the Harvard Department of Sociology. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Randall Kennedy, Reva Siegel, and Martha Minow for their ongoing support of my work in this area. Orlando Patterson, Mary Waters, Dani Rodrik, David Wilkins, Duncan Kennedy, Lani Guinier, Cristina Rodriguez, Tino Cuellar, Kevin Davis, Katrina Wyman, Joshua Fischman, Karen Brown, Alex Raskolnikov, Kevin Johnson, Charles Ogletree, Ken Mack, Steve Legomsky, David Abraham, Martha Mahoney, Kimani Paul-Emile, Ian Ayres, Brad Snyder, Lior Strahilevitz, Devon Carbado, Jim Greiner, Michael Froomkin, Adam Cox, Anne Alstott, Jennifer Gordon, Peter Schuck, Richard Brooks, Ryan Goodman, Gerald Neuman, Peter Henry, Lant Pritchett, Dillon Alleyne, Neville Lewis, Tony Harriott, Richard Bernal, Howard Chang, and Nealia Khan of the Harvard Statistical Consulting Service provided helpful comments. I am indebted to the CARICOM Ministries of Labour and faculty at the University of the West Indies for making themselves available for interviews on ongoing research. I am similarly grateful to Kerry Preibisch, David Griffith, Heather Gibbs, other researchers affiliated with the North South Institute (Ottawa, Canada) and the Canadian High Commission. Nicardo Neil, Anneke Hamilton, and Densil Reid offered excellent research assistance. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.

in which screening is precise, sanctioning is effective, and compliance is high. On the basis of this study, this comparative immigration law project contends that the United States should partially outsource screening and sanctioning to source-labor countries.

This Article critiques the historical uninational approach to immigration law. This approach fails to recognize that there are critical asymmetries between the United States and the countries from which aliens originate in their capacity to gather information about potential entrants and to sanction visa violators. This recognition leads to the following insight: source-labor countries are often better placed to screen because they can access accurate information about potential entrants from their communities. Source-labor countries are also often well-placed to deter noncompliance because, through collective sanctioning, they can influence communities of origin to persuade their members to abide by visa terms. The criminal law scholarship regularly recognizes the impact of norms on deterring crimes; this ethnographic study suggests that the same may be true with respect to immigration violations. This Article contends that aliens are more likely to be compliant so long as the authorities design legal rules that augment compliance norms already present in source-labor communities and incentivize community members to reinforce them.

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INTRODUCTION

Anywhere you turn, macca jook yu.¹

A majority of Americans cite immigration as a leading issue,² just behind the economy, national security, and health care, with many Americans citing disrespect for the law by undocumented aliens as their primary concern.³ Yet this urgency is not reflected in the law review literature, which has largely failed to address the “disconnect” between goals and

1. “Anywhere you turn you will be stuck by thorns.” This is a Jamaican proverb that is sometimes utilized to capture the sentiment that it is often an exercise in futility to create incentives for persons to play by the rules. DICTIONARY OF JAMAICAN ENGLISH 252, 284 (F. G. CASSIDY & R. B. LE PAGE eds., 2d ed. 2002) (providing definitions of the words).

2. Joseph Carroll, *Iraq, Economy, Healthcare, Immigration Top Vote Issues*, GALLUP, Dec. 10, 2007, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/103132/Iraq-Economy-Healthcare-Immigration-Top-Vote-Issues.aspx>.

3. The reader should be aware that the guest worker programs that are the subject of this Article raise profound questions of justice. There is an ongoing and well-documented tension between the state’s interest in the provision of low-cost labor and its concern with the protection of human rights more generally and ideal citizenship in particular. These concerns include but are not limited to the following: whether the presence of a large-scale population of temporary guests institutionalizes the exclusion of noncitizens from the constitutional mainstream, undermines political community, and denigrates the value of citizenship; whether these programs undermine wages and workplace protections for both guests and native workers; and whether such programs legitimate the application of a broader “trade paradigm” to human beings that commodifies labor. Moreover, under the specific proposal contained in this Article, justice concerns would be arguably augmented by the high dependence of the United States on a non-U.S. actor. The question necessarily arises: can the United States expect a source-labor country to reliably incorporate human rights and antidiscrimination norms into administration of the program? I am fully cognizant of these concerns, which provide fertile ground for further work and will be given a full hearing in a later paper. The following is a partial list of references that address these concerns. *See, e.g.*, MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 56–61 (1983) (opposing guest worker programs on the grounds that they do not conform to the liberal egalitarian principles that govern full membership in a just state); *see also* CANADIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: EXEMPLARY ESSAYS (R. Beiner and W. Norman eds., 2000); JOSEPH H. CARENS, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY: A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000); DUAL NATIONALITY, SOCIAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP (Randall Hansen & Patrick Weil eds., 2002); Louis Michael Seidman, *Fear and Loathing at the Border*, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 136, 140 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995); James Woodward, *Commentary: Liberalism and Migration*, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 59, 82 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992). For a discussion of the impact of low-skilled alien workers on wages of citizen workers, see generally GEORGE BORJAS, FRIENDS OR STRANGERS: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (1990) (noting the disproportionate impact on the most disadvantaged, including urban residents and African Americans). For broadly skeptical discussions of guest worker programs in the legal scholarship, see HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15–37 (2006). For skeptical but more targeted critiques of guest worker programs (in their current configuration), see Jennifer Gordon, *Transnational Labor Citizenship*, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503 (2007); Cristina M. Rodríguez, *Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another*, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219.

outcomes in immigration law.⁴ The goal of immigration law is to ensure that aliens receive pre-entry screening and be sanctioned if they side-step that screening.⁵ The outcome, in sharp contrast, involves the de facto permanent residence of twelve million undocumented persons, the overwhelming majority of whom have never been screened or sanctioned.⁶ Immigration debates now focus almost entirely on undocumented workers, obscuring another crucial but underexamined immigration difficulty: questions of institutional design. Given that failures in the design and conduct of guest worker programs clearly increase the size of the undocumented population, this Article addresses the challenges of designing effective institutions through the guest worker provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).⁷

4. This point has been made by Peter Schuck. See Peter H. Schuck, *The Disconnect Between Public Attitudes and Policy Outcomes in Immigration*, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 17 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007). Hiroshi Motomura has argued that this disconnect has received little attention in the law review literature because of the conventional emphasis on the postentry treatment of aliens. Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, *Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens*, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857 (2007). This emphasis arises at least partially from the fact that aliens have virtually no legal personhood outside the United States, with limited access to constitutional protections. See, e.g., *Galvan v. Press*, 347 U.S. 522, 530–32 (1954); *Harisiades v. Shaughnessy*, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952); *United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); *United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams*, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904). As such, the law review literature has been disproportionately focused on the treatment of aliens once they arrive in the United States. The primary exception to this scholarly silence on the pre-entry screening is Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, *The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law*, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2007).

5. See U.S. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY: RESTORING CREDIBILITY (1994), available at <http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/exesum94.pdf>.

6. This figure is taken from the work of Douglas Massey, a leading authority on the size of the undocumented population. See Douglas S. Massey, *Borderline Madness: America's Counterproductive Immigration Policy*, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION, *supra* note 4, at 129. Estimates generally indicate that there are between ten and fourteen million undocumented persons in the United States. See DAVID A. MARTIN, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., TWILIGHT STATUSES: A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED POPULATION (2005); JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 3 (2005), available at <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf>.

7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006) (guest worker provisions). Failed guest worker programs are a primary contributor to the size of the undocumented population in several developed countries. The World Bank has argued in a recent annual report devoted to migration that worldwide labor mobility trends will lead guest worker programs to remain at the center of contentious political debates worldwide. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 72 (2009). Nowhere is this observation truer than in the United States, the world's largest importer of unskilled persons. See Philip L. Martin, *Economic Integration and Migration: The Case of NAFTA*, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 419, 437 (1998). See generally LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE COME: BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON GLOBAL LABOR MOBILITY (2006). In the last three decades, the population of migrants in high income countries has doubled, registering an annual growth rate of 3%. WORLD BANK, *supra*, at 26–27. Migrants now constitute nearly 2.9% of the population worldwide, and 8.3% of the population of industrialized countries. *Id.* Over 90% of these migrants are low-skilled persons who would typically only qualify for legal entry into developed countries as guest workers. *Id.* at 43.

The widely publicized political backlash that accompanied President George W. Bush's recent proposal⁸ to expand the guest worker program sent a clear message.⁹ There will be no program expansion until the government is able to credibly screen for temporary workers and sanction those who do not comply with the terms of admission. If the criminal law is any guide for immigration law, the public demand for a tough approach to screening and sanctioning may stem from entrenched political and psychological factors and is not likely to abate any time soon.¹⁰ While there has been much hand-wringing in the law review literature about the increasingly blunt policies that have resulted from hardening attitudes,¹¹ there has been little discussion about the underlying problem that appears to be fueling the public backlash—what can actually be done to screen for aliens who will abide by the terms of their visas and to sanction those who do not.

Traditionally, institutional design scholarship has faced a major constraint—the influence of the dominant uninational conceptualization of immigration law. This persists even in the face of a growing recognition that aliens increasingly live transnational lives.¹² The uninational approach

8. For a summary of the reform proposal, see Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform Act (Jan. 7, 2004), available at <http://web.archive.org/web/20040110025405/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-1.html>.

9. For a summary of the stakes involved for both Democrats and Republicans in the highly contentious debate, see David Nitkin & Matthew Hay Brown, *Bush's Push for Compromise Is Greeted with Skepticism: President Encounters Wary Democrats and Some Republican Opposition*, BALT. SUN, Feb. 2, 2007, at 2A; see also Kerry Howley, *Guests in the Machine*, REASONONLINE, Jan. 2008, <http://www.reason.com/news/show/123474.html> (describing the controversy engulfing the guest worker program, not only among legislators but also more broadly).

"Give the Senate some credit," James Surowiecki wrote in the June 11 *New Yorker*: "In shaping the current immigration-reform bill, it has come up with one idea that almost everybody hates." *Hates* was an understatement. President George W. Bush had been pushing for some sort of guest worker program since before the 9/11 attacks, and as that idea inched closer to realization in 2007, his critics grew more vitriolic. Right-wingers . . . excoriated Bush for his starry-eyed idealism, and left-wingers . . . came out against the entrance of hundreds of thousands of new immigrants.

The New York Times complained that no worker should be sent home; *National Review* complained that no worker would go home. *The New Republic* said the plan fell within "the tradition of the African slave ship" . . .

Id.

10. Sara Sun Beale, *What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law*, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997).

11. Stephen Legomsky's work typifies this approach and provides a helpful summary of other sympathetic views. See Stephen H. Legomsky, *The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms*, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007).

12. The transnational nature of the alien population is a major theme in the sociological literature, but the law review literature generally appears not to have incorporated this insight. For a summary of the transnationalism research, see Peggy Levitt, *Salsa and Ketchup: Transnational Migrants Straddle Two Worlds*, in THE CONTEXTS READER, AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (Jeff Goodwin & James Jasper eds., 2008). I

to immigration law reform focuses almost entirely on new federal immigration law in the United States. Little energy is expended thinking about binational intervention. This Article seeks to change that.

Although a primary goal of immigration law is to collect predictive information about which aliens are likely to be desirable entrants, the United States currently finds itself in the absurd position of screening aliens utilizing poor information, with little reference to the countries from which aliens originate, even as these countries often have better information about their nationals. In an effort to mitigate this clear informational disadvantage, this Article contends that the United States should execute bilateral arrangements with source-labor countries to partially outsource the screening function. This Article also recognizes that source-labor countries are also well-placed to aid in sanctioning noncompliant aliens, even when those aliens are already on American soil, through their influence on communities from which aliens originate. Thus, the United States also stands to benefit from partially outsourcing the sanctioning function. Can the United States expect other countries to reliably meet their screening and sanctioning commitments? This Article argues that the answer is yes. In a competitive globalized context in which developing countries prize the access that their nationals have to the American labor market, the repeated game-like nature of their interactions with the United States increases the likelihood that source-labor countries will actually meet their commitments and will incentivize their nationals to do the same.

This Article includes a comparative immigration law study of a Canadian program for guest workers from Jamaica (Jamaica-Canada program). In this particular program, screening appears to be precise, sanctioning is effective, and compliance is high. This finding is striking against the background of less successful compliance, among a similar population of Jamaican guest workers in the United States. While the differences in compliance rates may appear to be minor, they are hardly marginal when viewed in the context of the large undocumented population, which is comprised primarily of low-skilled persons who would typically only qualify for entry as guest workers. Although this discussion focuses on systemic differences in program design between the United States and Canada as a possible explanatory factor, there are competing rationales for the differential levels of visa compliance, and it is not possible to attribute definitively these differences to program design without the benefit of further research. Rather, this case study is meant to be the beginning of a dialogue—a hook for a larger conversation with a focus on the reasons for visa compliance as told by the guest workers themselves.

acknowledge that my utilization of the transnationalism concept is unconventional. The sociology literature generally refers to transnational migrants as citizens and/or permanent residents of two societies. However, the transnational lives of guest workers clearly raise similar issues. Kim Barry has made a similar point in the context of citizenship theory. See Kim Barry, *Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context*, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11 (2006).

In other areas of legal scholarship, ethnographic research has been effectively used to aid interdisciplinary analyses of compliance and deterrence.¹³ The aim of this Article is to use “on the ground” research to shed light on similar questions of institutional design in the context of immigration law. Through the lens of this research, this Article will demonstrate why a continued uninational approach to immigration law makes little sense.

This Article relies on three essential moves, which will be succinctly referred to as (1) the information screening component; (2) the legal compliance component; and (3) the collective sanctions component. The information screening component argues that persons who are proximate to visa applicants may be incentivized to share with officials inside information as to which persons are likely to be law-abiding short-term guests. The legal compliance component contends that, among the subjects of this study, visa compliance is dominant even when they leave their home countries because their communal norms prioritize visa compliance, and they lose status in their communities if they deviate from these norms. The collective sanctions component contends that astute officials utilize group accountability rules to send signals to community members about the costs associated with breaking immigration laws, which incentivize them to enforce these norms.

Part I sets up the problem by providing a fuller discussion of the difficulties associated with screening and sanctioning and a demonstration of why current academic responses to these challenges are insufficient. Part II offers a new approach that emphasizes outsourced prescreening and outsourced norms-based sanctioning and then provides the empirical and ethnographic evidence in support of such an approach. Part III explains why this proposal works. More specifically, Part III focuses on the central role played by the community screener. She functions as an “intermediary in trust” who stands to lose her primary currency, namely, the credibility of her advice, if those who she recommends abscond. Building on Richard McAdams’s esteem-based model and Eric Posner’s signaling model of norms promulgation, Part III also argues that, through the stigmatization of visa violators, there is a persuasive case that governmental policy can amplify visa-compliance norms in the communities from which guest workers originate. Part IV addresses the elephants in the room, including corruption, *sui generis* concerns about the relevance of the proposal to

13. For an article that summarizes a broad range of interdisciplinary writing on compliance and deterrence issues, see Dan M. Kahan, *Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence*, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997). One such classic ethnographic study, which has been highly influential in criminal law scholarship, is CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, *JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS* (1942). For an example of the influence of this work, see Tracey L. Meares, *Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement*, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191 (1998). Another such influential study is ELIJAH ANDERSON, *STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY* (1990). For an example of the utilization of this work, see Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, *Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City*, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 809–13 (1998).

larger, less closely knit source-labor communities, and concerns surrounding the applicability of the proposal to persons who lack access to community networks to testify to their reliability. To mitigate this final concern, this Article proposes self-selecting visa groups in which members bear the risk of default of other members. Part IV also addresses a final concern. Under the broader proposal, the United States would essentially be retaining a foreign government to act as its agent—a highly controversial policy in the current political context. This section makes the case that governments with high degrees of dependence on the United States will have minimal incentives to breach since the costs of defection are high.

I. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF IMMIGRATION LAW REFORM: SCREENING FOR SHORT-TERM TYPE AND SANCTIONING DEFECTORS

A. *A Tale of Impossibility*

There is nothing more permanent than temporary workers.¹⁴

At the center of the recent highly divisive deliberations over comprehensive immigration reform was a program to reform the guest worker provisions of the INA¹⁵ by significantly increasing the number of guest workers and allowing them to work in a wide range of sectors.¹⁶ President George W. Bush was the primary advocate of the reform proposal, emphasizing that his support was contingent on the *temporary* tenure of guests.¹⁷ The proposal did not receive broad support in Congress, where it spawned a plethora of counterproposals.¹⁸ Indeed, given the controversy surrounding the immigration issue, the critique of the guest

14. For a widely cited quasi-academic discussion of the challenges of sanctioning, see Philip L. Martin & Michael S. Teitelbaum, *The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers*, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 117, 131 (2001). See also Martin, *supra* note 7.

15. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006).

16. For the key provisions of the guest worker reform proposal, see Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec'y, *supra* note 8.

17. *Id.*; see also Press Release, The White House, President Signs Homeland Security Appropriation Act for 2006 (Oct. 18, 2005), available at <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/hls/WH/20051018-2.pdf> ("You see, we got people sneaking into our country to work. They want to provide for their families. Family values do not stop at the Rio Grande River. People are coming to put food on the table. But because there is no legal way for them to do so, through a temporary worker program, they're putting pressure on our border. It makes sense to have a rational plan that says, you can come and work on a temporary basis if an employer can't find an American to do the job. It makes sense for the employer, it makes sense for the worker, and it makes sense for those good people trying to enforce our border." (statement of President George W. Bush)).

18. Consider the several manifestations of McCain/Kennedy comprehensive immigration reform bills of which this Article only mentions a few, including, for example, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong.; the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.; and the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005). See also Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005, S. 1438, 109th Cong.; Save America Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2005, H.R. 2092, 109th Cong. (sponsored by Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee).

worker proposal represented a rare instance of convergence among both Democrats and Republicans.¹⁹ Critics seemed unconvinced that “guests” would actually remain “guests.” A vocal population of constituents jammed congressional phone lines to express their opposition to the program expansion.²⁰ The issue featured prominently in the presidential campaign with one candidate, Mitt Romney, ominously warning that a new guest worker program threatened to simply replicate the impossible situation that the United States had faced before, namely, creating a population of permanent temporary workers.²¹

The evidence is on the side of the critics. One such “impossible” situation was America’s primary historical experience with guest worker programs, a bilateral labor treaty known as the Mexican *Bracero* program.²² In this program, screening was poor, visa-overstay rates were high, and sanctioning was minimal.²³ During the program’s two-decade tenure, there was a significant spike in the apprehension of undocumented persons who had been admitted as guest workers and had not complied with their visa terms.²⁴ More than four decades since the demise of the *Bracero* program, immigration reform debates demonstrate that concerns surrounding screening and sanctioning persist.

Why is screening guest workers so difficult? The government is generally better at screening than popular discourse would suggest. After all, over one million aliens enter the United States daily, the overwhelming majority of whom are temporary visitors who have been successfully

19. For both Republican and Democratic critiques of President George W. Bush’s guest worker proposal, see H.R. 2092; Press Release, Governor Mitt Romney on Immigration Reform (June 4, 2007), *available at* http://web.archive.org/web/20070607181345/www.mittromney.com/News/Press-Releases/Immigration_Reform_Statement.

20. Americans Against Illegal Immigration was among the opposition groups that organized the congressional phone calling program. See Americans Against Illegal Immigration, Stop the Illegals Now!, <http://www.stoptheillegalsnow.com/help/callrep.php> (last visited Mar. 21, 2009).

21. Michelle Oddis, *Immigration Reform: Makes Romney, Breaks McCain*, HUMAN EVENTS.COM, May 25, 2007, <http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=20872>.

22. The now-infamous *Bracero* (“farmhand”) program was inaugurated under a bilateral agreement with Mexico during World War II to meet critical agricultural labor shortages and ultimately involved widespread visa overstays and deportations. See KITTY CALAVITA, *INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S.* (1992); BARBARA A. DRISCOLL, *THE TRACKS NORTH: THE RAILROAD BRACERO PROGRAM OF WORLD WAR II*, at 53–55 (1999); ERNESTO GALARZA, *MERCHANTS OF LABOR* (1964). There are a few discussions of the *Bracero* program in the law review literature, which include Camille J. Bosworth, *Guest Worker Policy: A Critical Analysis of President Bush’s Proposed Reform*, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1100 (2005); Maria Elena Bickerton, Note, *Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program*, 79 TEX. L. REV. 895, 909 (2001); Merav Lichtenstein, Note, *An Examination of Guest Worker Immigration Reform Policies in the United States*, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 689 (2007).

23. For a general discussion of the program’s failings, see Douglas S. Massey & Zai Liang, *The Long-Term Consequences of a Temporary Worker Program: The US Bracero Experience*, 8 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 199 (1989).

24. *Id.* at 204; see also Martin & Teitelbaum, *supra* note 14.

screened.²⁵ However, in the guest worker context, screening poses peculiar challenges. Applicants are generally the poorest citizens of poor countries.²⁶ The applicants generally lack the traditional documentary mechanisms to credibly establish that they are likely to be short-term guests.²⁷ For example, they are less likely than high-skilled or high-income applicants to be able to provide tangible evidence of traits that are predictive of short-term tenure including source-country ties (such as assets or professional ties in their home country). Moreover, these individual-level constraints are augmented by nationwide resource and governance constraints in poor countries, which undermine the applicants' efforts to provide credible evidence of their inclination to play by the rules (such as police reports).²⁸

Why is sanctioning such a challenge? Again in the guest worker context, sanctioning raises peculiar challenges.²⁹ This difficulty arises from the tenuous nature of the guest workers' ties to the state and the broader society, which in turn arises from the parallel universe that they inhabit at the margins of society. Moreover, even if aliens arrived legally in the first place, as temporary visa recipients, their formal legal tenure in the United States is necessarily brief. This reality only augments the tenuous nature of their ties.³⁰ Guest workers rarely interact formally with state institutions, even when they enter legally, and formal interaction with state institutions is even less likely if they later overstay their visas and become undocumented.³¹ The fragility of these ongoing ties complicates the deterrence issue because it is arguably more difficult to deploy formal sanctions against such persons.

B. *Heading in the Wrong Direction: Current Academic Approaches to the Problem*

1. Screening

Although there has been renewed academic interest in guest worker programs, the scholarship displays a disproportionate focus on "first order

25. Most of these persons are nonimmigrants, the overwhelming majority of whom enter under the B1-B2 category, which is referred to in shorthand as the visitor visa for business or pleasure. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 413-18 (8th ed. 2002).

26. The World Bank annual report details the relevant characteristics of this population that pose difficulties in screening. See WORLD BANK, *supra* note 7, at 57-58.

27. *Id.* at 59-60.

28. *Id.* at 73.

29. There are differing views about the difficulty of deploying sanctions against undocumented workers. For a summary of the differing views, see Tamar Jacoby, *Immigration Nation*, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 50 (2006); see also Massey & Liang, *supra* note 23.

30. Jacoby, *supra* note 29.

31. *Id.*

issues,”³² that is, on what the ultimate goals of guest worker programs should be in light of the underlying moral commitments of a liberal constitutional democracy.³³ The scholarship has an expansionist flavor with a focus on the admission of more aliens, for longer periods, and with a broader cadre of rights, and thus displays a clear detachment from restrictionist political realities. This is not atypical. The underlying current of most immigration law scholarship is expansionist.³⁴ Like the broader immigration law review literature, scholarship on guest workers leaves crucial questions of institutional design unexamined.

The work of Adam Cox and Eric Posner is a prominent exception to this scholarly trend. They emphasize second-order institutional design questions, namely, how to best screen for those aliens who satisfy stipulated first-order goals regarding number, type, and tenure.³⁵ These scholars characterize immigration screening primarily as an informational problem,³⁶ in that a state must meet the challenge of obtaining enough information to ascertain whether a potential entrant matches its type preferences. The principal design choice for any state is between *ex ante* screening, in which an alien is screened on the basis of pre-entry information and denied entry if she does not fit the state’s first-order goals, and an *ex post* system, in which an alien is screened on the basis of postentry information and deported if she does not meet first-order policy

32. See Motomura, *supra* note 4. The term “first order” is Adam Cox and Eric Posner’s. See Cox & Posner, *supra* note 4, at 811.

33. See, e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, *Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law*, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955; Karla M. Campbell, *Guest Worker Programs and the Convergence of U.S. Immigration and Development Policies: A Two-Factor Economic Model*, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 663 (2007); Howard F. Chang, *Immigration and the Workplace: Immigration Restrictions as Employment Discrimination*, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 291 (2003); Bradly J. Condon & J. Brad McBride, *Do You Know the Way to San José? Resolving the Problem of Illegal Mexican Migration to the United States*, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 251 (2003); Andrew J. Elmore, *Egalitarianism and Exclusion: U.S. Guest Worker Programs and a Non-subordination Approach to the Labor-Based Admission of Nonprofessional Foreign Nationals*, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 521 (2007); Ruben J. Garcia, *Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws*, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737 (2003); Philip Martin, *Guest Workers: New Solution or New Problem?*, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289; Lori A. Nessel, *Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform*, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 (2001); Belinda I. Reyes, *The Impact of U.S. Immigration Policy on Mexican Unauthorized Immigration*, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 131; Michael J. Wishnie, *Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers*, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497 (2004).

34. Peter Schuck has made this point. See Schuck, *supra* note 4.

35. See Cox & Posner, *supra* note 4.

36. Cox and Posner’s primary focus is on mechanisms of screening immigrants (that is, persons who are admitted for long-term residence and possibly citizenship). However, they point out that their analytical framework is also applicable to the challenges of admitting temporary guests. *Id.* at 813–14; see also Michael J. Trebilcock, *Immigration Policy*, in PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 259 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Michael J. Trebilcock, *The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy*, 5 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 271 (2003).

goals.³⁷ While most developed economies at least purport to rely on ex ante screening to match aliens to the low-skilled service subsectors of their labor markets, Cox and Posner note in the American context, this goal is illusory. Rather, the low-skilled sector of the U.S. labor market is currently serviced by a shadow system of illegal immigration.³⁸ Cox and Posner conceptualize the illegal immigration system “as a de facto ex post screening system operated under the guise of an ex ante system.”³⁹

They support this claim by shifting their focus from the formal legal framework to the actual enforcement decisions.⁴⁰ The formal legal framework provides that persons are deportable simply on the basis of illegal entry. However, as a practical matter, rather than pursuing all undocumented entrants (as they are required to do in theory on the basis of the ex ante rule), officials have historically only pursued those who commit other (i.e., nonimmigration) crimes. Thus, in reality, the system as it relates to low-skilled workers is an ex post system in which entrants, who later provide evidence of undesirability, are screened only after their entry, and then deported. In their words, “[c]ontact with the criminal justice system, then, becomes the de facto proxy for type.”⁴¹

Cox and Posner argue that the emphasis on ex post screening is not coincidental. Rather, they argue that this system is in fact a reflection of a clear institutional preference for an ex post system to an ex ante system in the context of low-skilled aliens.⁴² A primary rationale for this preference is that, for the low-skilled subsector of the labor market, ex post indicators typically provide more accurate information than ex ante indicators.⁴³ Specifically, juxtaposing the selection of low-skilled workers with high-skilled aliens in Canada and other developed economies (where aliens earn visa points which are indexed to their qualifications), they argue that for low-skilled workers, ex ante indicators are typically unreliable predictors of desirability.⁴⁴

However, this institutional bias for ex post screening does not comport with the expressed preferences of actors in both the legislative and executive branches. For several decades, a coalition of shifting political alliances has sought to ensure that the admission of large numbers of low-skilled persons has been premised on temporary tenure.⁴⁵ In a post-9/11 world, the modern manifestation of this sentiment is not only an insistence on temporary tenure, but a simultaneous insistence that they are screened

37. See Cox & Posner, *supra* note 4, at 812.

38. *Id.* at 820.

39. *Id.* at 845.

40. *Id.*

41. *Id.* at 846.

42. *Id.* at 847.

43. *Id.*

44. *Id.*

45. ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 436 (2006).

prior to arrival.⁴⁶ Although Cox and Posner do not contend that reliable ex ante screening for short-term type is futile, an assumption regarding the inherent difficulty of ex ante screening underlies their work, and imposes significant constraints on available policy modifications to temporary worker programs. Another difficulty with the Cox and Posner framework is its American-centric focus in a globalized world, namely, its failure to take account of those actors outside the United States that can help in ex ante information gathering.

2. Difficulties in Sanctioning and Deterrence

Why do some persons comply with immigration laws? Unlike the criminal law, where there is a plethora of writing on compliance and deterrence,⁴⁷ the legal scholarship is largely silent on these points in the context of immigration law.⁴⁸ While Cox and Posner briefly discuss the importance of finding appropriately calibrated ex post sanctions (which deter entry from undesirable types but not from desirable types), they do not discuss what such sanctions might look like.⁴⁹ Moreover, although scholars have bemoaned the historical ineffectiveness of the state, and the increasing proposals to sanction,⁵⁰ they have not addressed the peculiar challenges that accompany sanctioning in the temporary worker context.⁵¹

Low-skilled aliens are often not visible to the broader population, and as such, are often “out of sight.” The difficulty of sanctioning is exacerbated by the disinclination of many Americans to cooperate with the authorities, given their deep ambivalence about sanctioning persons who may lack formal permission to work, but who are otherwise law-abiding and making

46. *Id.*

47. For a good summary of the deterrence literature in the criminal law context, see Kahan, *supra* note 13.

48. There have been occasional allusions in the literature to this issue. For example, Peter Schuck wrote over a decade ago reflecting on the centrality of the deterrence question:

The essential idea of a prevention strategy is quite simple and compelling. To the extent that aliens who are likely to be illegal at entry or to lose their legal status after entry can be deterred from attempting to come to the United States, or detected and prevented from entering the United States once they arrive, the necessity for detention—indeed, for any further enforcement activity—will be minimized.

Peter H. Schuck, *INS Detention and Removal: A “White Paper,”* 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 678 (1997).

49. See Cox & Posner, *supra* note 4, at 847–48.

50. For a discussion of the increasing popularity of punitive measures in the name of deterrence, see DANIEL KANSTROOM, *DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY* (2007); David Cole, *Enemy Aliens*, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002); Legomsky, *supra* note 11.

51. This has been recognized by a range of scholars from other diverse academic disciplines who advocate policy prescriptions that fall at differing points along the political spectrum. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, *BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION* (2002); Jacoby, *supra* note 29; Martin, *supra* note 7; Martin & Teitelbaum, *supra* note 14; Demitrios G. Papademetriou, Philip L. Martin & Mark J. Miller, *U.S. Immigration Policy: The Guestworker Option Revisited*, 21 INT’L MIGRATION 39 (1983).

critical contributions to the economy.⁵² Clearly, the transitory nature of this population is relevant in institutional design. As was the case in screening, the challenges become more imposing if they are viewed through an American-centric lens.

In the current political context, there is likely to be profound skepticism about drawing on the help of actors outside the United States to help perform a function, such as sanctioning, that is seen as central to the federal government's immigration power. Outsourcing proposals are now referred to pejoratively as the "Halliburton approach," and are likely to be viewed particularly skeptically in the immigration context.⁵³ However, the United States regularly incentivizes third-party entities *within* its borders not only to screen for aliens who violate immigration laws, but also to aid in the process of sanctioning by reporting them. This is precisely the function of employer-sanction statutes that penalize employers who fail to screen aliens for work permits and report noncompliant persons.⁵⁴ Moreover, even outside the United States, third-party entities have historically aided screening and reporting.⁵⁵ For example, carrier sanction statutes penalize carriers who fail to screen aliens before they board vessels to the United States, or fail to report those who utilize fraudulent documentation.⁵⁶

Unlike the criminal law review literature,⁵⁷ which recognizes the implications for institutional design of ethnographic research (both in populations that sanction and populations that are being sanctioned), the immigration law literature has not typically utilized such research. Arising partly from such research, there has emerged in the criminal law literature a more full-bodied account of deterrence arising from a broadened understanding of "what the law is."⁵⁸ In contrast, debates about sanctioning and deterrence in the context of immigration have as their point of departure a very formalistic understanding of law, one that privileges formal legal regimes and does not account for the effect of norms on law abidance. A

52. MASSEY ET AL., *supra* note 51.

53. CNN commentator Lou Dobbs is perhaps the best-known proponent of such views. For commentary on Lou Dobbs's approach, which is comedic but nevertheless elucidates the skepticism toward such proposals, see Andy Borowitz, *Illegal Immigrants to Write Immigration Bill*, HUFFINGTON POST, June 13, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-borowitz/congress-hires-illegal-im_b_51903.html.

54. See The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006) (codifying employer sanctions); Bosniak, *supra* note 33 (discussing the history of employer sanctions).

55. ZOLBERG, *supra* note 45.

56. For a general discussion of carrier sanctions, see Erika Feller, *Carrier Sanctions and International Law*, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 48, 55–63 (1989).

57. See, e.g., Meares, *supra* note 13.

58. It is not my intention to engage the long-standing debate arising out of the law and society movement about what law "is," but simply to make the point that it has long been recognized in the criminal law context that social norms have a significant impact on how persons debate criminal law. For a summary of work about what constitutes "law" from a law and society perspective, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, *A Non-essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism*, 27 J. L. & SOC'Y 296 (2000). For a widely cited example of norms enthusiasm in the criminal context, see Dan M. Kahan, *Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence*, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997).

robust literature has developed on norms-based sanctioning and deterrence in the criminal law.⁵⁹ The immigration law review literature has no such equivalent.

II. A NEW APPROACH: PARTIALLY OUTSOURCED PRESCREENING AND PARTIALLY OUTSOURCED NORMS-BASED SANCTIONING

A. *First-Order Assumptions*

The discussion that follows is based on several admittedly contested and controversial assumptions surrounding "first-order" issues. In his historical examination of immigration policy, Aristide Zolberg demonstrates that immigration policy has always been characterized by an ongoing political consensus (supported by shifting alliances in different historical periods) that economic growth is inextricably tied to an ongoing flow of newcomers.⁶⁰ Even in those historical periods where new entrants were "not welcome,"⁶¹ an ongoing coalition of business interests ensured that they were nevertheless "wanted" as temporary entrants.⁶²

The practical manifestation of this "pragmatic restrictionism" is that a consensus has developed among the legislative and executive branches that an ongoing inflow of low-skilled entrants to fill service jobs is necessary.⁶³ However, given the historical and ongoing ambivalence about admitting low-skilled aliens on a long-term basis, any politically practicable course of action is likely to be premised on short-term tenure. Any policy proposal is also likely to be accompanied by more stringent mechanisms of ensuring that persons who enter temporarily are in fact held to these terms.⁶⁴

59. Building on Jeremy Bentham's classic conception of deterrence, the recognition of the impact of norms on deterrence (normative deterrence) is a recognized concept in the criminal law; it does not appear to have been applied to immigration law. Examples of such work include Katharine K. Baker, *Sex, Rape, and Shame*, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663 (1999); Dan M. Kahan, *What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?*, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996) [hereinafter *Alternative Sanctions*]. For a critique of proposals arising from a norms-based approach to deterrence, see Bernard E. Harcourt, *Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style*, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998). For other discussions which recognize the importance of norms in discussions of deterrence, see Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, *The Utility of Desert*, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-88 (1997) (contending that the classical utilitarian conception of deterrence fails to appreciate the importance of norms in governing the willingness of citizens to obey the law); see also Alvin K. Klevorick, *On the Economic Theory of Crime*, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NOMOS XXVII, at 289, 292-94, 301-04 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985) (maintaining that the economic theory of deterrence fails to account for the role of societal norms).

60. See generally ZOLBERG, *supra* note 45, at 432-59.

61. *Id.* at 436.

62. *Id.*

63. See Jacoby, *supra* note 29, at 50 ("In fact, the nation is far less divided on immigration . . . than the current debate suggests.").

64. *Id.* ("Some legislators . . . insist that any new slots be strictly temporary: workers would be admitted, perhaps without family, for a period of two or three or six years and would then go home . . .").

Notably, the proposals that attracted the most support in the last Congress were all predicated on the temporary tenure of low-skilled aliens, combined with mechanisms of tracking compliance.⁶⁵

This political consensus has clear implications for the first-order issue of “type.” In the same way that INA displays clear preferences for certain “types” among the highly skilled (e.g., computer scientists) with accompanying mechanisms of validating type (e.g., professional qualifications),⁶⁶ immigration policy will increasingly focus on meeting an articulated political consensus for short-term “types” among the low-skilled, with accompanying mechanisms of validating type. This first-order goal dictates certain second-order design priorities. There will be a renewed institutional focus on finding reliable predictors of likelihood of temporary tenure and screening applicants according to these predictive criteria,⁶⁷ as well as a renewed focus on devising mechanisms of effectively sanctioning those who are ultimately not short-term “types.”⁶⁸ The discussion that follows is essentially a refinement of these “second-order” institutional design questions.

B. *The Partial-Outsourcing Normative Deterrence Proposal*

This section’s partial-outsourcing normative deterrence proposal consists of five principal prongs. Given that a primary goal of immigration law is to collect information about the desirability of potential entrants, the first prong contends that the United States should execute flexible bilateral arrangements with source-labor countries to partially outsource the ex ante screening function.⁶⁹ The source-labor country would then leverage its

65. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong.; Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong.; Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005); Save America Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2005, H.R. 2092, 109th Cong.

66. For a general discussion of the clear preference for certain types of talent, see Ayelet Shachar, *The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes*, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006). For example, in many developed economies there is a clear preference for migrants with particular technical skills (e.g., computer scientists) who can contribute to the high-growth technical sectors of the economy.

67. See, e.g., Cox & Posner, *supra* note 4, at 824 (“A central second-order design question is how to sort applicants for immigration, so that only the desired types are admitted, where the desired type is just the type of person who satisfies the criteria derived from a state’s first-order immigration goals.”).

68. See Jacoby, *supra* note 29, at 50–51 (“[V]irtually every major media outlet has surveyed public attitudes on the issue, and the results have been remarkably consistent. . . . [A]n overwhelming majority . . . would like to see Congress address the problem with . . . tougher enforcement . . .”).

69. Transparency concerns are also significant in light of the partial outsourcing proposal, particularly given extensive evidence that corruption was rife in previous iterations of such programs, such as the *Bracero* program, and also that there was systematic exclusion of particular groups of persons who were disenfranchised within their own societies. See generally CALAVITA, *supra* note 22; DRISCOLL, *supra* note 22; GALARZA, *supra* note 22. This subject is a fertile area for further research, but to remain true to its own liberal egalitarian principles and to mitigate such concerns, it seems clear that, at a minimum, the United States should only enter into bilateral labor agreements with liberal egalitarian

proximity to its nationals, to aid in the process of screening for those who are likely to be compliant with their visas.⁷⁰

This proposal does not advocate the wholesale outsourcing of the screening function. Rather, under this partial outsourcing proposal, the United States would set the screening rules, while incentivizing the source-labor country to administer them.⁷¹ The aim is to provide appropriate oversight, but allow sufficient flexibility for the source-labor country to

democracies. Although the academic literature widely acknowledges that democratic mechanisms of accountability are at best imperfect, democratic mechanisms are helpful in holding both political and administrative actors accountable for transparent noncorrupt administration. For a discussion of the imperfections of liberal democracies in monitoring the actions of politicians and administrators, see MATTHEW R. CLEARY & SUSAN C. STOKES, *DEMOCRACY AND THE CULTURE OF SKEPTICISM: POLITICAL TRUST IN ARGENTINA AND MEXICO* (2006); R. Douglas Arnold, *Can Inattentive Citizens Control Their Elected Representatives?*, in *CONGRESS RECONSIDERED* (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1993). This is particularly the case if the contracting country has a vibrant civil society with a network of interest groups, which function alongside a free press to monitor politicians and administrators. This has certainly been the case in Jamaica, where political actors are disinclined to interfere with the program given its overwhelming popularity with the electorate.

70. This Article focuses on the community for generating norm entrepreneurs and enforcers. Yet simultaneously it focuses on the nation for screening and compliance. This leads to an obvious question: is the nation the best unit for generating the norms that are necessary to a model of normative deterrence? It bears emphasizing that in all of the analytical models that I utilize in this work (including Richard McAdams and Eric Posner's), the state is assumed to be the most effective agent of norm generation, primarily because it is able to promulgate and enforce rules. However, the state and the nation are not necessarily synonymous, and I acknowledge that the small size of Jamaica (and the corresponding proximity of the state to the communities in which these norms are being promulgated) may have influenced the ability of the state in this particular context to influence norms.

Nevertheless, it appears that the Jamaican situation is a "hard case" for a variety of reasons including high levels of crime, visa noncompliance and deportation from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. It is notable that, even in this hard case, the model still appears to work. This might speak to the model's generalizable nature with respect to other less difficult contexts (i.e., with lower visa-noncompliance rates). However, there may be differences in the applicability of this model to different societies depending on a variety of factors, including proximity to the United States, the credibility and effectiveness of the state as an actor in the communities from which guest workers originate, the extent to which communities are closely knit, the pervasiveness of reputational effects, and so on. One could also imagine instances in which the nation might not be the best unit of either screening or enforcement. This leads to the intuition that the model might be modified to suit particular society-specific contexts (depending on the proximity of the source-labor nation-state to the communities from which guest workers originate).

71. I do not address the issue of how the costs associated with administering this model should be shared between guest workers, employers, the source-labor country, and the United States. This is a potentially rich area for later research, but a reasonable initial response would be to note that there generally will be significant differentials in the capability of the source-labor nations and the United States to bear the costs, and that the principles of distributive justice (embodied in the work of a range of liberal theorists including Bruce Ackerman, Michael Walzer, and John Rawls) should apply. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, *SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE* (1980); JOHN RAWLS, *A THEORY OF JUSTICE* (1971); WALZER, *supra* note 3. It seems reasonable to argue that the labor-importing countries, which are undoubtedly richer as measured by a variety of indices (and who arguably benefit disproportionately from labor importation) should bear the more significant proportion of the costs associated with the administration of such programs.

adapt the screening rules to its own conditions on the ground, with the United States intervening only when source-labor innovations appear to be inappropriate.⁷² Simultaneously, to improve the deterrence function, the second prong contends that the United States should enlist the support of the source-labor country in imposing sanctions.

One mechanism of augmenting the likelihood of appropriate screening and sanctioning is the utilization of collective sanctioning systems. These have historically been employed effectively to improve compliance in a variety of informal arenas in which formal legal structures were either not present or insufficient, and in modern times "as a regulatory strategy of delegating deterrence."⁷³ The third prong argues that the United States should structure the bilateral arrangements so as to penalize the source-labor country by reducing available visas if the overstay rates of its nationals become too high.⁷⁴ In turn, the source-labor country would likely

72. In this regard, there are similarities to Ian Ayres and John Braithwaites's concept of regulatory pyramids of enforcement. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, *RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE* (1992).

73. Daryl J. Levinson, *Collective Sanctions*, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 349 (2003). Daryl Levinson provides a brief overview of the utilization of collective sanctions both historically and in modern times, with an emphasis on functional rationales for collective sanctioning, emphasizing that central features of modern legal systems, including vicarious, joint and several, and corporate liability, are justified utilizing similar functional rationales. For a further discussion in the law review literature of the moral and functional justifications for collective sanctions, see also Saul Levmore, *Rethinking Group Responsibility and Strategic Threats in Biblical Texts and Modern Law*, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 85, 89-90 (1995).

Beyond the law review literature, the economics literature also has an extensive discussion of functional rationales for collective sanctioning. For example, economic historians credit collective sanctioning for facilitating a commercial revolution in late medieval times by allowing long-distance commercial exchange between parties who had no prior knowledge of each other. See Avner Greif, *Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition*, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Avner Greif, *Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders*, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989). In the Jamaican context, collective sanctioning appears to work well when applied to microlending. For a broader discussion of the importance of collective sanctioning to microfinance (in the form of joint liability lending), see Maitreesh Ghatak, *Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect*, 110 ECON. J. 601, 602 (2000).

74. One could argue that the country and the community are standing behind the guest worker as guarantors in a very loose utilization of the term. There are analogies to the economic rationales for using guaranties, with the community playing an analogous role. See Avery Weiner Katz, *An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract*, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1999). The utilization of the term "guaranty" is controversial; indeed, this proposal may call to mind Soviet-era "guest worker" programs in which threats against communities were used to secure the return of guest workers. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, *Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange*, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-40 (1983). It bears emphasizing that the program discussed herein recommends the "soft" utilization of group accountability, and, as such, the proposal would not countenance any such abuses. In any event, the issue of ensuring individual human rights protections in programs such as these is a fertile area for future work. As a preliminary matter, this Article recommends that the United States enter into outsourcing programs only with liberal egalitarian democracies, partly in an effort to guard against such abuses.

It bears emphasizing that there is an evolving international norm against collective punishment. See Levinson, *supra* note 73. The question becomes: does it matter whether

discount the probability that members of any given community will become guest workers if their fellow community members abscond. This would create incentives for community members to alert the authorities if they are in danger of selecting a neighbor who is not a short-term type. Community members would also be incentivized to monitor the compliance decisions of their neighbors since their own prospects of future work as guest workers would be compromised if their neighbors abscond.

In a practical micro application of this macro principle, the model's fourth prong advocates that the source-labor country should designate intermediaries in communities from which guest workers originate to both screen and sanction.⁷⁵ Typically, these intermediaries should be community leaders who are trusted both by the authorities and their communities. In instances when an applicant's type is not readily apparent to the authorities, these intermediaries would share inside information, which helps with type prediction. When persons abscond, future references from these intermediaries should be discounted. In so doing, the authorities would be sanctioning intermediaries and indirectly sanctioning the communities that depend on them for access to the program. Collective sanctioning would still apply, but in a "thin" rather than "thick" version.

The central role of the community in improving compliance is not coincidental. The fifth prong argues that communal norms may exercise more influence on visa-compliance decisions than the formal legal framework.⁷⁶ If visa-compliance decisions are norms-based, these

the sanction recommended really involves the selection of a country for the privilege of involvement in a guest worker program, rather than exclusion of a country from generally available migration privileges? I would argue that the key difference is that a collective reward is being withheld (as opposed to a collective punishment being imposed), although the literature uses the term sanctioning more broadly to reference both group punishments and rewards. *See, e.g., id.* at 376. Nevertheless, the utilization of group accountability principles raises significant justice concerns, which present a fertile area for later work. In the philosophy literature, there is a general view that collective sanctioning conflicts with the liberal obligation to prioritize individuals as moral agents. *See generally, e.g.,* COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991); PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); GROUPS AND GROUP RIGHTS (Christine Sistare, Larry May & Leslie Francis eds., 2001); LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY, GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS (1987); Joel Feinberg, *Collective Responsibility*, 65 J. PHIL. 674 (1968).

75. The term intermediary is influenced by the utilization of the term "intermediary in trust" in the sociology literature. *See generally* JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 197-240 (1990).

76. This model is influenced by the norms literature in its recognition that subjects feel obligated to follow certain rules, irrespective of formal legal arrangements, because of an internalized moral commitment or fear of informal sanctions. Surprisingly, immigration law appears largely untouched by the norms scholarship. It is an account of legal influence (as opposed to legal centralism). Although the economics literature appears to be most influential in modern discussions of "norms" scholarship, the discussion of "norms" has a distinguished heritage that predates this contribution with interdisciplinary contributions from the fields of anthropology and sociology. For a summary of anthropological and sociological work in this area, see SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978); Richard Abel, *What We Talk About When We Talk*

intermediaries in trust may fulfill another important function. As community leaders, they are also typically norm influencers who are well-placed to both identify and recommend only those who subscribe to norms that prioritize visa compliance and to stigmatize and sanction those who do not.

Another potential benefit of a partial-outsourcing approach is that the United States could enlist the support of the source-labor country in imposing sanctions on overstaying workers. Notably, these sanctions could operate not only (directly) against visa violators who are found and deported to the source-labor country, but also (indirectly) against violators who are underground in the United States. More specifically, informal sanctions may be activated against a particular worker if the United States knows that the worker has overstayed and is unable to locate him, because the worker's ongoing voluntary contacts with the intermediary who originally recommended him and his entire community of origin would give members an opportunity to express disapproval.

There is yet a further subtle point to be made. In this model, the power to sanction is derivative of the power to screen. Even if the source-labor government had no legal authority to sanction persons for visa infractions on American soil, it would nevertheless be able to wield credibly the threat of sanction not only against visa violators but also against its communities—through its power to deny visa violators future access to guest worker visas and the power to discount recommendations from community leaders, thereby indirectly penalizing the community.⁷⁷

The recognition of the impact of norms on deterrence is a recognized concept in other areas of the law; it appears not to have been applied to immigration law. In emphasizing informal sanctions, this proposal is unusual in the current environment in which sanctioning is synonymous in the popular discourse with a range of punitive proposals including increased detentions.⁷⁸ While such punitive proposals may fulfill an “expressive” function,⁷⁹ they are not in keeping with the “progressive credentials” of the original Benthamite conceptions of deterrence,⁸⁰ which in “the most

About Law, in *THE LAW AND SOCIETY READER* 1, 1–10 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1995); Sally Falk Moore, *General Introduction*, in *LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER* 1, 2 (Sally Falk Moore ed., 2005) [hereinafter Moore, *LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY*]. The landmark text in the law and economics literature is ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, *ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES* (1991).

77. Notably, sanctioning and screening are separate and analytically distinct functions that should be distinguished and need not necessarily be coupled. Moreover, there are other potential sanctions that could be added to the model that are not derivative of the power to screen.

78. See Legomsky, *supra* note 11 (providing examples of these punitive trends); see also Jacoby, *supra* note 29; Martin & Teitelbaum, *supra* note 14.

79. See Kahan, *supra* note 59 (articulating the importance of the “expressive” function of punishment).

80. Bentham's classic definition of deterrence compared the utility of benefits to the disutility of losses. As long as losses exceed benefits, or pain exceeds pleasure, then the

theoretically elegant applications . . . have always involved showing how *less* can be *more*.”⁸¹ In the spirit of showing how *less* can be *more*, this model posits an unconventional, norms-based approach to augmenting deterrence.

C. Evidence that This Approach Will Work

This section lays out a statistical background for the larger argument by examining the differences in visa-compliance rates for similar populations of Jamaican guest workers in Canada and the United States. This section then turns to a microlevel qualitative study of a sample of administrators and guest workers to discern the rationales that underlie their visa-compliance decision making. It begins with a brief note on methodology.

1. Methodology

The decision to focus on the Jamaica-Canada program was driven by a number of data points.⁸² After Mexico, Jamaica supplies the largest absolute numbers of documented guest workers to both the United States and Canada, and by some preliminary estimates, low-skilled Jamaicans fall within the top five nationalities on a per capita basis in the undocumented population in the United States.⁸³ Indeed, the metaphorical Jamaican on Saturday Night Live working nine jobs (in clear violation of immigration laws) signifies the extent to which Jamaican and “undocumented worker”

actor is deterred from undertaking the activity. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1823) (1789).

81. Dan M. Kahan, *Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem*, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 645 (2000).

82. There are few academic studies of Jamaican guest workers in Canada. The exceptions are R. G. Cecil & G. E. Ebanks, *The Caribbean Migrant Farm Worker Programme in Ontario: Seasonal Expansion of West Indian Economic Spaces*, 30 INT’L MIGRATION 19 (1992); R. G. Cecil & G. E. Ebanks, *The Human Condition of West Indian Migrant Farm Labour in Southwestern Ontario*, 29 INT’L MIGRATION 389 (1991).

83. Jamaicans are believed to have the highest representation on a per capita basis in the undocumented population in Canada. This information was garnered from an interview with the Chief Technical Officer in the Ministry of National Security in Jamaica. For a broader discussion of high levels of noncompliance by Jamaicans with immigration laws in the United States, see Zagros Madjd-Sadjadi & Dillon Alleyne, *The Potential Jamaican Impact of Criminal Deportees from the United States*, 5 J. ETHNICITY & CRIM. JUST. 29 (2007). Utilizing statistical modeling, the authors provide indicative statistics on the number of Jamaicans in the undocumented population. The preliminary estimates regarding the representation of Jamaicans among the low-skilled documented and undocumented population in both Canada and the United States arise from conversations with researchers in the Remittance Research Project in the Department of Economics at the Jamaica Mona Campus of the University of the West Indies. See also Milton Vickerman, *Jamaica*, in THE NEW AMERICANS: A GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION SINCE 1965, at 479 (Mary C. Waters & Reed Ueda eds., 2007). Milton Vickerman notes that the Jamaicans consistently express a high desire to migrate and that the emigration rate is propelled “by an entrenched tradition of migration and economic hardship.” *Id.* Taking into account the population size, the emigration rate is very high, with migrant Jamaicans constituting a third of Jamaica’s population. *Id.* In 2001, Jamaicans were the second-most-likely population on a per capita basis to migrate to the United States. *Id.*

are intertwined in the popular imagination. Moreover, the visa-compliance rates among Jamaican guest workers in Canada are high, even against a more mixed record of visa compliance among Jamaican guest workers in the United States. Additionally, there are clear analogies between labor markets in the United States and Canada. Canada has critical labor shortages in comparable economic sectors and has historically relied on aliens from the same proximate markets in Latin America and the Caribbean to fill these shortages,⁸⁴ albeit in more limited numbers.⁸⁵

Given the high visa-compliance rates among Jamaican guest workers in Canada, the principal objective of the study was to explore the rationales that they offer for their visa-compliance decisions. The author conducted the field work.⁸⁶ The research design was primarily qualitative and the study methodology was multimethod in focus. This is a difficult to reach population and, partly for this reason, the study was not randomized. Rather, utilizing referrals from guest workers and program administrators, the author developed a snowball sample, a method that is often used in studies of subjects with similar characteristics.⁸⁷ The typical subject was an agricultural worker from a rural Jamaican community.⁸⁸

The approach was both “top down” and “bottom up.” Research participants included Jamaican guest workers, legal officers in Jamaica and

84. For a comparative discussion of American and Canadian historical approaches to immigration generally, see WILL KYMLICKA, *FINDING OUR WAY: RETHINKING ETHNOCULTURAL RELATIONS IN CANADA* (1998).

85. See generally MARTIN COLLACOTT, *CANADA’S IMMIGRATION POLICY: THE NEED FOR MAJOR REFORM* (2002).

86. I acknowledge the work of Mr. Densil Reid, who has significant experience in fieldwork in rural populations. He conducted thirteen of the guest work interviews and participated in twenty-two others.

87. Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein, whose work has been utilized in the law review scholarship on entitlement programs, employed a similar methodology in their landmark study of a difficult to reach population, namely, single mothers on welfare. See Matthew Diller, *The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion and Entrepreneurial Government*, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1171–72 (2000) (citing KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, *MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK* (1997)). The methodology of this study was influenced by grounded theory approaches to qualitative research. See ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, *BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES* (1990).

88. Although tourism workers and certain tradespersons in construction are now eligible to access the Canadian labor market under more recently developed Canadian visa programs, in the Jamaican context, these persons are not understood to be low-skilled since they have received some formal training in trade schools and completed tests to gain certifications. As such, I restricted the sample to persons who are understood in the Jamaican context to be “low-skilled,” namely, agricultural workers. Their access to overseas labor markets is most restricted, since they are considered high risks for immigration infractions. They typically lack formal training, are low-income, and are poorly situated to provide the collateral that is required to demonstrate their suitability for visas.

Across a broad range of temporary visa categories, Canadian consulates have the discretion to require aliens to provide evidence of their educational levels, of real property ownership, or ownership of other items of value. These are taken as evidence of financial or professional ties to the country of origin. Low-skilled Jamaicans do not have such “capital,” and have typically not had legal access to Canada outside of family sponsorship programs. As such, participants in the Jamaica-Canada program are trendsetters.

Canada who negotiate the bilateral agreements, administrators in both jurisdictions who promulgate rules, admissions officers who conduct screening, industry representatives who are integrally involved in the program's administration, and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) and union representatives who advocate on behalf of migrant farm workers. The research was designed to draw on a range of different regions from which guest workers originate, including the sugar-cane-producing areas, the banana-producing areas and the vegetable-producing areas. Interviews constituted the principal research method and detailed interviews are on file with the author. In total, interviews were conducted with eighty-one informants, including fifty guest workers.⁸⁹

2. Brief Background Framework to the Jamaica-Canada Program

The Jamaican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program⁹⁰ is governed by bilateral administrative arrangements that are formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)⁹¹ between Canada and Jamaica; under the MOU, the Jamaican government formally assumes partial responsibility for screening potential candidates and informally assumes responsibility for tracking visa violators and reporting them to Canada. Under the terms of the MOU, the number of visas offered, and the criteria and terms attending admission, are entirely within the discretion of Canada.

From time to time, the MOU is updated by bilateral administrative agreements. Government representatives meet to negotiate critical aspects

89. Notably, in addition to the small sample size, a limitation of the study is that I was unable to locate any persons who have not complied with the visa terms, since these persons have presumably disappeared into the underground economy in violation of Canadian laws and interview subjects were either unwilling or unable to provide access to them. An online counterpart to this Article contains more detailed statistical analyses. I hold detailed transcripts of all the interviews with guest workers on file.

90. The Jamaican Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program operates within a tripartite institutional framework. At the federal level, the program is implemented within the framework of the Immigration Refugee and Protection Act and Regulations, which is premised on the "Canadians First" principle. *See* Commentary to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, intro., at 13, *reprinted in* LORNE WALDMAN, CANADIAN IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE LAW PRACTICE 13 (2004). At the provincial level, the program is governed by employment, labor, and health regulations. The program also operates within bilateral administrative arrangements between Canada and Jamaica. Employment contracts between Canadian employers and migrant workers are also important; they are subject to review by both Canada and Jamaica. *See* VEENA VERMA, N. S. INST., THE MEXICAN AND CARIBBEAN SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS PROGRAM (2003).

91. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Canada and the Government of Jamaica Concerning the Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, Dec. 5, 1994 [hereinafter Can.-Jam. MOU] (on file with author); *see also* Irving André, *The Genesis and Persistence of the Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program in Canada*, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243 (1990). The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) continues in force unless terminated by either party giving three months notice in writing to the other party. If such notice has not been provided, the MOU remains in force. The MOU is typically updated by administrative agreements. The most recent administrative agreement is the 2008 Agreement for the Employment in Canada of Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers.

of the program, such as visa numbers, eligibility requirements, and wage levels. The MOU is executed by a cabinet-level official in each signatory country and administered by two government agencies in Canada, namely, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSD), and the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOL or Ministry of Labour) in Jamaica. It has been the historical practice of both Canada and Jamaica to include other stakeholders as observers to these negotiations to ensure that the program has the “buy-in” of parties with diverse interests. These include employers’ groups, farm worker representatives, and Jamaican and Canadian NGOs.

The benefits and compromises for each of the program’s stakeholders are evident in the manner that the program is made operational. To incentivize employers to participate, the Canadian government subsidizes their recruiting costs. Canada extends diplomatic status to a team of Jamaican social workers (“liaison officers”) who monitor the welfare of the workers within Canada. In this way, Canada mitigates the concerns of farm worker representatives and NGOs about health and labor infractions. Moreover, it supplements its own regulatory framework through an additional informal level of oversight since employers agree to site visits by Jamaican liaison officers (who are in turn obligated to report infractions to the Canadian authorities). Finally, to mitigate concerns about the long-term deployment of farm-workers in “dead-end” jobs with no potential for skills improvement, the Canadian government has offered targeted development assistance to farm workers to upgrade their agricultural training. Notably, these human capital improvements benefit both Canadian farms and family farms in communities of origin.

The ongoing “buy-in” of diverse stakeholders has benefits that extend beyond operational success. Parties interviewed emphasized that the ongoing expansion of the program over four decades and its perceived immunity to political attack even in the face of a rising anti-immigration sentiment within Canada clearly reflected the fact that the stakeholders, who represented a broad range of interests on the Canadian political spectrum, were satisfied with its results and invested in its continuing success.

The criteria for selection appear to be minimal. Under the MOU, the MOL, which has administrative responsibility for candidate selection, is asked to recommend healthy, able-bodied persons with no criminal record and farming experience. Although the Jamaican government may not modify the Canadian criteria, they are encouraged to augment these criteria—which are a “floor”—with other screening measures that are appropriate to Jamaican conditions. For example, the Jamaican government seeks evidence of ties to support an applicant’s contention that he is likely to return to Jamaica. Since applicants are not typically able to provide documentary evidence of assets that tie them to Jamaica, the MOL uses supplementary indicators. For example, the operation of a family farm is typically taken as an indication of home ties. Moreover, the MOL regularly

supplements police reports (which are sometimes unreliable) by utilizing informal community networks to ensure that potential participants are not involved in criminal behavior that has not otherwise been detected by formal state measures. Parties interviewed indicated that it was atypical for Canada to reject candidates who had been recommended by the Jamaican government. The MOL is clearly motivated to improve its candidate pool by the ever-present possibility that Canada could reduce the number of visas available, particularly given that other countries are clamoring for similar bilateral arrangements.

Although it is not a matter of official policy, it appears that a preference exists for candidates from closely knit, typically rural communities, where persons are likely to be well-known to their neighbors. The MOL currently designates persons of standing in the rural communities to refer candidates. These persons typically include parliamentary and local government representatives, clergy, and social workers. These persons are assigned a certain number of farm-work "tickets" and are asked only to issue those tickets to community members who are likely to abide by the program's terms.

Under the terms of the MOU, the number of visas offered is entirely within the discretion of Canada. As such, although not explicitly articulated in the MOU, administrators pointed out that Canada retained the right to reduce the pool of available visas if the Absent Without Leave (AWOL) rates were deemed to be unacceptable. The MOL is able to track AWOL rates closely since they remain in close contact with Canadian employers and typically arrange return flights to Jamaica for guest workers. Moreover, all guest workers are required to present evidence of their timely exit from Canada to the MOL upon their return to Jamaica. If a guest worker goes AWOL, he is deemed to have committed an immigration infraction, since remaining "in status" is contingent on maintaining employment with the specific employer to whom the guest worker was contracted at the time that the visa was originally granted.⁹²

The MOL is obligated to report AWOL guest workers expeditiously to Canada. It provides briefings to parliamentary representatives, with warnings issued if high AWOL rates threaten to compromise the ability of a member of Parliament and her network of recommenders to issue further referrals. While the MOL generally does not issue outright bans on particular communities, the MOL indirectly bars the consideration of persons from their communities (by barring community recommenders). Penalties may also extend in rare instances to the entire community of origin.⁹³

92. See JAMAICAN MINISTRY OF LABOUR, JAMAICA-CANADA PROGRAM HANDBOOK (n.d) (on file with author).

93. If guest workers are involved in (non-immigration) crimes that have the potential to compromise the program (such as narcotics trafficking), the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MOL or Ministry of Labour) has, in the past, invoked a severe penalty by formally barring consideration of the entire community of origin for limited time periods. Indeed, in

All of the subjects interviewed characterized the flexible nature of the arrangements between Jamaica and Canada as critical to the program's success, to the extent that it encouraged administrators, pursuant to regulatory powers granted to them by the Jamaican Parliament, to tweak the program by promulgating their own rules to meet the changing interests of the parties and the various stakeholders.⁹⁴ The MOL appears to generously utilize their administrative discretion to tweak the program to respond to changing conditions on the ground. Administrators noted that, although they did not have the legal authority to punish guest workers for going AWOL since infractions were committed in another jurisdiction, they exercised considerable power to penalize because of their ability to discount recommendations. In response to obvious justice concerns, stakeholders also emphasized that, although the arrangements were informal, they were transparent. For example, there appears to be a strong emphasis on reinforcing the rules through education. All farm workers must participate in an orientation class prior to departure from Jamaica that clearly communicates the penalties for going AWOL for individual farm workers and their recommenders and the likely reduction in visas if AWOL rates become too high. This orientation is reinforced upon arrival in Canada by Jamaican liaison officers prior to workers being deployed to farms.

3. Tale of the Numbers: AWOL Rates Against Other Indicative Data Points

a. *A Brief Comparative Background on the American H-2A Program*

There are a number of data points that give us an indicative sense of the success of the Jamaica-Canada program. One such data point is the disparity in visa-compliance rates between Jamaican guest workers in Canada and in the United States.⁹⁵ A more detailed statistical analysis is included in the online database, although relevant summary findings are

one highly publicized incident in which two guest workers were found transporting drugs, the MOL barred the entire community of origin. Administrators argued that it was highly likely that community members were aware of these drug crimes, and, as such, it was reasonable to expect that they would have so warned the MOL. Citing justice concerns, MOL officials indicated that such bans typically were time-limited.

94. Interview with Chief Liaison Officer, Can.; Permanent Sec'y, Ministry of Labour, Jam.; Former Senior Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister; and Former Permanent Sec'y, Ministry of Labour, Jam. (Aug.–Nov. 2007) (notes on file with author).

95. The ideal approach would be a comparative study of U.S. and Canadian guest worker programs, with the appropriate statistical controls to attempt to account for the relative contribution of competing explanatory factors to the success of the program. Agricultural guest workers who travel to Canada and the United States appear broadly similar in that they originate from similar communities, have similar skill sets, and fill similar agricultural jobs; systemic differences in program design might lead the programs to attract different categories of applicants. As intimated earlier, there is clearly the need for a comprehensive comparative study of similarly situated guest workers who participate in the U.S. and Canadian programs, with appropriate controls, in an attempt to isolate the relative contributions of a series of factors that might account for differential compliance rates.

included below. The comparable population of Jamaican guest workers in the United States is admitted under the H-2A provisions of the INA, which govern the admission of agricultural workers to the U.S.⁹⁶

The American program differs from the Canadian program in a number of ways, but the following differences are worth emphasizing. The program is generally characterized as being “privatized,” which is reflected in a number of ways. First, there is no bilateral agreement that acts as a framing device for the promulgation of supplementary rules by the Jamaican government. Second, unlike the Jamaica-Canada program, in which both governments play a critical regulatory role, in the United States, employer groups operate with relatively little oversight and appear to dominate the recruitment process. To the extent that there is Jamaican government involvement in the screening process for American guest workers, this is entirely the result of the voluntary actions of those American employers who delegate screening to the MOL, as opposed to being built into the framework of the program by bilateral agreement or incentivized by subsidies such as those offered to employers by the Canadian government.⁹⁷

Third, the Jamaican government plays no role in monitoring the compliance of Jamaicans. Unlike Canada—where the Jamaican government is integrally involved in arranging the return flights for the guest workers, which puts them in a position to easily identify AWOL workers, report their immigration infractions to Canada, and express their disapproval to recommenders and their source-labor communities—the Jamaican government plays no such role in the United States. Finally, guest workers are not required to register with the Jamaican government upon their return home as a condition of receiving the “compulsory savings,” which are deducted from their salaries in Canada but not in the United States (except by voluntary arrangement). In summary, under the H-2A framework, Jamaican officials have virtually no influence in choosing guest workers (except by private arrangement) and monitoring their compliance while in the United States.

In general, even taking account of population differences and the broader structural differences in the agricultural sector between Canada and the United States, Canada is far less reliant than the United States on migrant farm workers, since the Canadian agricultural sector is more mechanized and farm work jobs appear to be more attractive to Canadian citizens than to American nationals. For example, in 2006, the number of migrant farm workers in Canada totaled 20,274. Of this number, 58% were Mexican, 30% were Jamaican, and the remaining guest workers originated in other

96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2000). Changes to the program currently are being considered. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Proposes Changes to Improve H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1202308094416.shtm.

97. In the past, there has been intervention by the Jamaican authorities, who, on the basis of unscrupulous actions by some private recruiters, now require all private recruiters to register with the government.

Latin American and Caribbean states.⁹⁸ That is, Jamaicans constitute slightly less than one third of documented migrant farm-worker population. (While there are not reliable figures on the undocumented population of farm workers in Canada, it is widely believed to be small.) The Jamaican government's influence with Canada derives partly from the high levels of representation of its nationals on both an absolute and per capita basis among guest workers. In the equivalent year, the U.S. government approved 56,183 H-2A visas; Jamaican nationals received approximately 10% of the total.⁹⁹ These agricultural workers are widely acknowledged to be a small fraction of the seasonal agricultural workers in the United States given that the overwhelming majority of migrant farm workers are undocumented.

b. Comparative statistics

The AWOL rates of Jamaican guest workers in Canada were juxtaposed with the AWOL rates of a comparable sample of Jamaican guest workers in the United States.¹⁰⁰ More specifically, a comparison was done between the AWOL rates of agricultural workers who entered Canada using Jamaican passports under visas granted pursuant to the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Workers program and H-2A visa recipients who were agricultural workers and entered the United States using Jamaican passports.¹⁰¹ Between 1988 and 2007 (the period on which this analysis

98. THE UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, THE STATUS OF MIGRANT FARM WORKERS IN CANADA: 2006–2007, at 6 (2008) [hereinafter STATUS OF MIGRANT FARM WORKERS]. It is also worth noting that data received from the Canadian High Commission in Jamaica indicates that migrant workers generally constitute between 35 and 50% of the total number of Jamaicans who receive nonimmigrant visas to Canada annually (the overwhelming majority of other recipients are temporary visitor visa holders). This contrasts with the United States, where guest workers constitute a much smaller percentage of the total number of Jamaicans who receive nonimmigrant visas. See *infra* note 99 and accompanying text.

99. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland Security Fact Sheet: H–2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program (Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1202308216365.shtm. Notably, Jamaican H-2A visa recipients constitute a small percentage of Jamaicans who travel to the United States on nonimmigrant visas each year. H-2A visa recipients generally constitute less than 10% of the total number of Jamaicans who receive nonimmigrant visas to the United States annually. For a general sense of the number of Jamaicans who apply and receive nonimmigrant visas on an annual basis, see Dionne Rose, *Post-911 Visa-Application Boom*, JAM. GLEANER, July 20, 2008, <http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20080720/news/news7.html>.

100. Going Absent Without Leave (AWOL) is in itself a violation of Canadian law, since under the terms of the visa, persons are only to remain in Canada as long as they are working with a specific employer (or for seven days beyond the final date of their labor contract). See Can.-Jam. MOU, *supra* note 91. These workers were comprised overwhelmingly (though not exclusively) of agricultural workers, in which there was some Jamaican governmental involvement (if only minimal as described above) since workers registered with the MOL, even if the MOL had more limited power over their selection and return arrangements.

101. See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance Appendices tbl.1 (n.d.), available at www.outsourcingimmigrationcompliance.com (enter username “guestworker” and password “guestworker” to access the website). Given the

has been based), trends in the data show that, in general, far more Jamaican workers go AWOL in the American guest worker program as compared to the Canadian program.

The AWOL rates for the twenty-year period of analysis (1988–2007) show that, on average, 5.3% of all Jamaican guest workers in the United States go AWOL, with a high of 9.8% in 1988. While in Canada, 3.5% of all Jamaican guest workers have gone AWOL in that time, with a high of 7.2% in 1988.¹⁰²

It is important to note that, while the differences between Jamaican AWOL rates in Canada and the United States may appear to be marginal, they should be viewed in the context of the large size of the undocumented population. There are approximately 12 million undocumented aliens, the overwhelming majority of whom are low-skilled persons who would only typically qualify for entry as guest workers.¹⁰³ As such, the difference of 1.8%¹⁰⁴ in comparative AWOL rates translates to 216,000 more persons going AWOL in the United States as compared to Canada if there were an equivalent population of undocumented aliens there.

Further, statistical analysis¹⁰⁵ of the AWOL rates for Jamaican guest workers in Canada and the United States within the period being examined demonstrates that there is a statistically significant difference between the means of the two AWOL rates. The results of the t-test¹⁰⁶ clearly indicate

passage of the major immigration reform legislation in 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the analysis was done utilizing figures after that date. The figures were compiled from source data that was provided by the Jamaican Ministry of Labour and Social Security through its archives and statistical bulletins. *See id.* tbl.1, nn.1–4. Discrepancies were identified in the AWOL numbers over the years 1997–2001, where U.S. AWOL numbers were extremely low in comparison to other years. Administrators in both the U.S. and Canadian programs agreed that the figures for these years appear to be atypical and, notably, were not prepared to eliminate the possibility of deficiencies in record keeping, due to resource constraints at the MOL. As such, AWOL numbers for 1997–2001 were imputed using Maximum Likelihood (EM) Estimation. *See id.* tbl.1, nn.1–4. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 16.0) was used to carry out this analysis.

102. *Id.* tbl.1.

103. *See* Massey & Liang, *supra* note 23.

104. This percent (1.8%) represents the difference between the average U.S. AWOL rate of 5.3% and the average Canadian AWOL rate of 3.5% for the twenty-year period of analysis.

105. The analysis was carried out using the SPSS 16.0. SPSS is a widely recognized statistical package utilized in social science research. *See, e.g.,* INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, GUIDE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA PREPARATION AND ARCHIVING: BEST PRACTICE THROUGHOUT THE DATA LIFE CYCLE (2005), available at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/access/dataprep.pdf>.

106. The AWOL rates for guest workers in Canada and the United States were inputted into SPSS 16.0. *See* Brown, *supra* note 101, tbl.1. An independent samples t-test was performed using “country” as the grouping variable (i.e., the United States and Canada) and the AWOL rates as the test variable. The means of the test variable (i.e., AWOL rates) were compared based on the specified values (i.e., Canada and the United States) of the grouping variable. This test was carried out to determine whether there was a statistically significant difference between the two sample means. The null hypothesis that was tested is that the difference between the means of the AWOL rates for guest workers in U.S. and Canadian programs over the period in review is zero. The alternative hypothesis tested is that the

that the average higher AWOL rates experienced for Jamaican guest workers in the United States as compared to Jamaican guest workers in Canada are not purely random.¹⁰⁷ In summary, the high levels of visa compliance in the Canadian program are striking when viewed against the background of visa-compliance levels among Jamaican agricultural guest workers in the United States

4. Rationales Governing Compliance Decisions¹⁰⁸

This section seeks to unpack the reasons that subjects offer for compliance. The study was particularly concerned with whether program design with an emphasis on legal rules was influential in a formal sense, or more informally, as mediated by community norms. There are a variety of sources of "law" that could potentially be influential with subjects. These include the bilateral arrangement between Canada and Jamaica, regulations promulgated pursuant to the MOL's administrative discretion, and Canadian immigration laws. There is also a network of informal rules, which are obligatory but fall short of formally state-enforced law. Subject interviews sought to engage the following questions: which laws and/or

difference between the means is not zero. Given the results of the t-test, the null hypothesis was rejected, in other words, there is a statistically significant difference between the means (using a significance level of 5%). Imputed data was used in this analysis. See *id.* tbl.1, nn.1-4.

107. See *id.* tbl.3.

108. For a comprehensive discussion of competing rationales for migratory trends, please see Douglas Massey, *Social Structure, Household Strategies and the Cumulative Causation of Migration*, 56 POPULATION INDEX 3 (1990). A more detailed note on the methodology in this section, which relies primarily on interviews with guest workers, is appropriate. The data was collected in two segments. The first segment focused on the legal framework that governs the Jamaica-Canada program, and exploratory interviews were conducted with key administrators who draft and enforce the rules that govern the movement of guest workers. In an effort to include a diverse range of experiences, interviewees included administrators with varying levels of seniority. I also conducted a focus group with key administrators.

The second phase focused on the factors that influence the visa-compliance decisions of guest workers. Detailed interviews were done with dozens of guest workers. I acknowledge concerns regarding whether the inclination of persons to share candidly might have been compromised by the absence of anonymity. Given the small size of Jamaica, the program in particular, and the referral methodology, faculty at the University of the West Indies, with experience in studying similar populations, indicated that it would be difficult to credibly assure persons of anonymity. Given this concern, I spent significant amounts of time cultivating confidence among individual guest worker subjects. The number of guest workers interviewed was restricted on this basis.

More specifically, I conducted detailed interviews with a small sample of guest workers, many of whom had been introduced by a member of a rural agricultural development agency, who regularly interacts with this population for research purposes. Although this person was employed by the government, he clearly had independently earned the trust of guest workers through repeated interactions with them over decades. Having cultivated relationships through his introductions with this smaller pool, the initial interviewees then provided me with introductions to a larger pool. The criteria for selecting persons for interviews were reviewed with the assistance of a researcher at the University of the West Indies, who had previously studied the guest worker population.

rules matter, how do they become obligatory, and how do they derive their moral justification?

a. *Competing Explanatory Frameworks*

Prior to turning to the reasons for compliance as told by the guest workers themselves, it is important to note that competing rationales emerged for the differential levels of visa compliance in exploratory interviews with economists at the University of the West Indies who study Caribbean migratory networks. The relative contributions of these competing explanatory factors offer a potentially fertile area for further study. While agricultural guest workers who travel to Canada and the United States appear broadly similar in that they originate from similar communities, have similar skill sets, and fill similar agricultural jobs, the ideal approach would be a comprehensive comparative study of the U.S. and Canadian programs, with appropriate controls, in an attempt to isolate the relative contributions of a series of factors that might account for differential compliance rates.

There are diverse competing explanatory factors of which only a few are offered here. First, there may be differential perceptions among Jamaicans of the comparative attractiveness of the United States and Canada as immigrant-receiving societies, with a clear preference for the United States. Second, it may be broadly perceived that the United States has higher tolerance levels for undocumented immigrants generally. Third, there are more extensive Jamaican networks in the United States and they are more socioeconomically heterogeneous. Since modern Canadian immigration law prioritizes the admission of skilled persons, Jamaican migration to Canada has been comprised disproportionately of professional persons, particularly in recent times. The more economically heterogeneous Jamaican networks in the United States may assimilate undocumented aliens more easily, with a corresponding reduction in the real and perceived costs borne by individual undocumented aliens to assimilate in the United States.¹⁰⁹ Researchers also noted that Jamaicans are well represented in major urban centers in the United States and, as such, farm workers in the United States are usually relatively close to thriving Jamaican communities. Jamaican guest workers in Canada are more likely to travel to agricultural communities that are more rural and remote.¹¹⁰ Notably, many of these

109. A finding by Catherine Colby with respect to Mexican farm workers in Canada may be relevant in this regard. She interviewed Mexican guest workers and found that they did not wish to remain in Canada, primarily because the small, rural Ontario towns where they worked had no Mexican communities into which they could easily assimilate. CATHERINE COLBY, *FROM OAXACA TO ONTARIO: MEXICAN CONTRACT LABOR IN CANADA AND THE IMPACT AT HOME* (1997).

110. Farm workers travel primarily to Canadian agricultural communities, many of which have historically been rural, although some have become more urban in recent times. Reflecting the program's historical genesis in Ontario, the representation is particularly strong in agricultural communities in southwestern Ontario. Tanya Basok, *He Came, He Saw, He . . . Stayed. Guest Worker Programmes and the Issue of Non-return*, 38 INT'L

communities remain relatively homogenous—farm workers would typically have to travel some distance to access Jamaican networks.

Fourth, although agricultural guest workers who travel to Canada and the United States appear broadly similar, systemic differences in program design might lead the programs to attract different categories of applicants. That is, the Canadian program might be more attractive to Jamaicans who have some broader set of characteristics that are correlated with risk aversion, who might be more inclined to participate in a program in which the Jamaican government assumes a clear “caretaker” role, while Jamaicans who have some broader set of characteristics that are correlated with a larger risk appetite might be more inclined to choose the United States, where there is more minimal Jamaican government involvement. These characteristics (that are correlated with risk appetite) might bear some relation to the likelihood that individuals will become undocumented.¹¹¹

Relatively little academic work has been done in this area and, as such, the data points are sparse, and one is limited to preliminary inferences. In light of these competing rationales for the differential levels of visa compliance among Jamaican guest workers in Canada and the United States, it is not possible to definitively attribute these differences to program design without the benefit of further research. Rather, these data points are meant to be the beginning of a dialogue—a hook for a larger conversation with a focus on the reasons for visa compliance as told by the guest workers themselves.

b. *The Importance of Intermediaries to Screening*

Nearly all of the subjects were referred to the program on the basis of a personal relationship with a recommender. Subjects cited relationships with community leaders, including political representatives, social workers, clergy, coaches in local sports leagues, and justices of the peace (equivalent to notary publics).¹¹² A few others had more indirect relationships and were introduced to community recommenders by family members or close friends who vouched for their character.¹¹³

MIGRATION 215, 216 (2000). There are far lower representations of farm workers in other provinces, but numbers have been increasing in recent years in other provinces. STATUS OF MIGRANT FARM WORKERS, *supra* note 98, at 6.

111. Please note that I am utilizing the term risk aversion in a general sense and not in the more specific academic sense in which it is conventionally utilized in economics and finance to refer to the behavior of consumers in conditions of uncertainty. Interview with Dillon Alleyne, Ctr. for Global Dev.; Univ. of the W. Indies (Oct. 2007); Interview with Claremont Kirton, Univ. of the W. Indies (Mar. 2008); Interview with Claremont Kirton, Univ. of the W. Indies (June 2007); Interview with Darron Thomas, Univ. of the W. Indies (Mar. 2008); Interview with Michael Witter, Univ. of the W. Indies (Mar. 2008).

112. Interviews with members of Jamaica Farm Work Programme in Jam. (Sept.–Nov. 2007) [hereinafter Programme Interviews] (subjects include AM, AS, AS, CB, CG, CH, CS, DB, DD, DD, DJ, DR, DT, DT, DW, EC, EW, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RB, RC, RJ, RK, RR, S, SB, SP, VH, WD).

113. *Id.* (subjects include DR, EC, FC, RB).

Subjects overwhelmingly concurred with the view that a referral from a community leader who had a relationship with the MOL was integral to gaining access to the program.¹¹⁴ None seemed to be perturbed by the disproportionate role played by political representatives and other connected parties in the referral process. The consensus view seemed to be that the MOL expressed a clear preference for persons from tightly knit communities, who were well-known to their neighbors and who operated family farms to which they would return. Given the lack of infrastructure in these communities, it was deemed to be impractical to access these referral networks without the support of these persons. Subjects seemed to reject any implication that selection processes were exclusionary.¹¹⁵ Several subjects noted that the process was at least partly meritocratic, with some taking pains to emphasize that they had provided references to support their contentions of character and a solid farming background.¹¹⁶

c. Why Intermediaries Matter to Subjects

The majority of subjects were repeat participants in the program who indicated that they counted on their overseas earnings to supplement their familial income.¹¹⁷ The majority appeared to be of the view that their repeat selection was dependent not only on positive evaluations from their employers, but also on the independent maintenance of a good relationship with the MOL.¹¹⁸ Since intermediaries represent their primary ongoing contact with the MOL for most guest workers, the maintenance of relationships with intermediaries was believed to be important.¹¹⁹

5. Overall Rationales for Compliance

All of the interviewees asserted (some quite emphatically) that they had never considered the possibility of not complying with their visa. A primary purpose of the interview was to ascertain which rationales dominated their decision-making matrices. Interviewees cited a variety of reasons to account for their disinclination to go AWOL. Interviewees alternatively cited: familial expectations of visa compliance; communal expectations of visa compliance including specifically such expectations from religious groups and loose neighborhood affiliations; patriotic commitments to Jamaica; and obligations to obey the law. There was also a

114. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, AS, CB, CG, CH, CS, DB, DD, DD, DJ, DT, DT, DW, DR, EC, EW, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RB, RC, RJ, RK, RR, S, SB, SP, VH, WD).

115. *Id.* (subjects include DR, EC, FC, RB, RC).

116. *Id.* (subjects include CG, DT, DW, GB, MH, RB, RJ, SP).

117. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RK, RR, S, SB, VH).

118. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RR, RH, S, SB).

119. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RR, RH, S, SB).

category of rationales that are broadly categorized as “other-worldly,” which sometimes bore religious overtones. Communal rationales appeared to predominate. The majority of subjects specifically noted that their community members expected compliance and they did not want to be held responsible for compromising either the access of their own community members or fellow Jamaicans to Canada.¹²⁰

a. *Law-Related Rationales*

One set of rationales might be broadly construed as law-related. All appeared to be aware of the diverse sources of law, with subjects alternatively referencing at least two of the following sources: Canadian law, Jamaican law (which appeared to be synonymous with MOL-promulgated rules), and the relationship between Canada and Jamaica (which appeared to be synonymous with the bilateral MOU between Jamaica and Canada). The majority appeared to distinguish between formal legal obligations (the breach of which carries the threat of state sanction) and informal obligations, whether they derived from family, community, or other-worldly commitments.¹²¹ However, amongst all subjects, law-related rationales appeared to be of only secondary importance in relation to other rationales. Notably, many subjects indicated that their obligations to family, community, intermediaries, and church were so important that these eclipsed formal legal obligations.

b. *Norms-Based Rationales*

All of the subjects provided reasons that might be broadly characterized as “norms-based,” with their rationales reflecting a clear notion that returning to Jamaica was not only preferable but also “right” (a term utilized repeatedly by some interviewees) or “Christian.”¹²² Subjects cited a range of value systems that are complementary and that are broadly sympathetic to compliance. Several subjects indicated that they would never consider absconding for the same reasons that they would never consider breaking other laws; absconding was not consistent with value systems that they held.¹²³ One subject utilized a patois phrase to connote the importance of a clear conscience. He had never had reason to “look over his shoulders” before, and had no desire to start now.¹²⁴

Other subjects cited religious commitments. One subject explicitly declared that “I grow up . . . Baptist so it give me a good settlement of the

120. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CS, DB, DD, DJ, DT, DR, DW, EC, EW, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RC, RJ, RR, S, SB, SP, WD).

121. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RC, RH, RR, S, SB, VH).

122. *Id.* (subjects include AM, CG, DJ, DT, G, H, HR, J, MH, MS, OM, RB, RC, RR, SB, VH).

123. *Id.* (subjects include AM, CG, HR, J, MH, MS, OM, RB, RC, RR).

124. *Id.* (subject DD).

brain. You know what is wrong and what is right.”¹²⁵ As such, choosing not to return was viewed as a morally inferior course of action. Choosing not to return home was alternatively characterized as “wutless” (worthless) or behaving like a “bwoy” (connoting a young irresponsible person).¹²⁶ The perception that going AWOL was immoral seemed to be deeply intertwined with interviewees’ perceptions of familial, communal, and national obligations.¹²⁷

c. Community-Based Rationales and the Competition for Esteem

Attachments that might be broadly characterized as communal included obligations to fellow farmers, social clubs, sporting leagues, and church groups. The importance of communal attachments, and the esteem that derives from such attachments, was implicit in that several subjects indicated that they would not have been selected if they had not been held in high regard. One subject implied that he was recommended because of his “discipline.”¹²⁸ Indeed, some subjects indicated that they derived further respect from fellow community members each time they were selected for the program, and they seemed unwilling to compromise this status.

Subjects spoke not only of their own obligations to community, but also independently of their perceptions of the communal disapproval that would befall them and their families if they did not return.¹²⁹ Several specifically referenced a prominent person in the community who had provided them a referral or had introduced them to a recommender who was anticipating their return.¹³⁰ In sum, it was clear that during their time in Canada, subjects maintained contact with a broader circle of community members who communicated their expectations, which appeared relevant to subjects’ decision making.¹³¹

d. Views of Absconders

The majority had either personal knowledge of or individual contact with a Jamaican guest worker who had gone AWOL.¹³² Notably, all of the subjects emphasized that they did not maintain ongoing relationships with these persons and emphasized that these persons had not come from their

125. *Id.* (subject DW).

126. *Id.* (subject CG).

127. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, EC, FC, G, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RC, RK, RR, S, SB, VH).

128. *Id.* (subject DW).

129. *Id.* (subjects include AM, CH, DB, DR, EC, FC, G, H, HR, J, L, M, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RR, S, SB, WD).

130. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, CB, CG, CS, DD, DJ, DT, DW, EW, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RC, RJ, RR, S, SB, SP, WD).

131. *Id.* (subjects include AM, CB, CG, DD, DJ, DT, HR, MH, OM).

132. *Id.* (subjects include AM, AS, AS, CB, CG, CH, CS, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, DW, EC, EQ, FC, G, GB, H, HR, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RJ, RK, RR, S, SB, SP, VH, WD).

communities. Only one person noted that he had personal knowledge of someone in his community who had gone AWOL. All of the interviewees were deeply intolerant of persons who went AWOL and some interviewees seemed offended at the notion that they would ever associate with such persons.

A majority of those interviewed seemed to sympathize with the view that there was a significant minority (but nevertheless, they emphasized, a minority) of potential guest workers who sought access to the program, with either an intention to abscond in Canada or at least a willingness to consider the possibility of absconding in Canada.¹³³ As one interviewee put it, “[g]rowing up, we all heard of persons who had gone away to farm, and then disappeared.”¹³⁴ While each of the interviewees contended that they personally would never go AWOL or even consider going AWOL, the consensus view seemed to be that persons from “country” (that is, rural Jamaicans) were different from “town persons.”¹³⁵ The key differentiating factor between “town” and “country” persons in the subjects’ minds was communal ties. Subjects noted that there was some incongruence between the broader social definitions of illegality with respect to immigration and the formal definition of illegality, particularly among “town persons.” One noted that, among many such persons, illegal immigration was not perceived to be a big deal (“ah nuh nutten” in Jamaican patois).¹³⁶ In the context of this broader ambivalent view of illegality, they seemed to believe that disappearance was entirely understandable, even as they viewed it negatively.

e. *Group Accountability and Views of Sanctions*

The perceived certainty and severity of sanctions appeared to be relevant to decision making. Several interviewees noted their awareness of the certainty and severity of sanctions in the event that they absconded. Notably, they were far less likely to cite the formal sanctions that were likely to be levied by Canada than the sanctions that would be levied by the Jamaican government and the loss of respect that they would experience in their communities.¹³⁷

133. *Id.* (subjects include AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, DW, EC, FC, G, G, H, J, L, M, MH, MS, OM, P, RB, RB, RC, RK, RR, S, SB, SB, VH).

134. *Id.* (subject VH) (translation).

135. *Id.* (subjects include AS, CB, CG, CH, DB, DD, DJ, DR, DT, DW, EC, FC, G, L, M, MH, P, RB, RH, S, SB, VH).

136. *Id.* (subject MH).

137. The subjects clearly understood deportation to be a sanction, although one might question the basis on which deportation might reasonably be construed as a sanction. If a guest worker overstays his visa, and the host country deports him, why is this not simply an enforcement of a contractual obligation that the guest worker agreed to (as a condition of his visa) in the first place? This question seems particularly pertinent in light of the longtime debate in the immigration law literature as to whether deportation should in fact be viewed as a punishment. See *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that “an order of deportation is not a punishment for crime”); cf. Legomsky, *supra* note 11 (arguing that theories of deportation overlap so substantially with those of criminal

The overwhelming view among subjects was that the MOL's utilization of collective sanctions was fair, particularly since it was perceived that such sanctions were utilized sparingly. The rule was clearly familiar, with one subject noting that "from ancient days from when I was small you heard about [persons] who run off and don't come back," and another deeming such persons to be "selfish" since they were aware that the community would suffer the consequences of their actions.¹³⁸ Only one subject questioned the appropriateness of collective sanctioning. Another subject noted that residents of rural communities were far better placed than the authorities to identify and bring pressure to bear on those who were at risk of being noncompliant. Importantly, subjects seemed sympathetic to the rationale that had been offered by MOL officials for their inclination to penalize community leaders who recommended absconders (and thus indirectly the community) by noting that these principles were already built into the program by Canada, since Jamaicans as a whole would risk losing visa slots if AWOL rates become unacceptable. As such, given this broader constraint that was perceived to be connected to the inherently competitive Canadian labor market, the MOL's actions were deemed to be reasonable.

While subjects did not make specific references to the Jamaica-Canada bilateral arrangements, they seemed generally to recognize that there was a formal process in which Jamaica was being held accountable to Canada. It also seemed clear that they recognized that the rules of the MOL were formulated pursuant to this process. Indeed, several subjects noted that they believed that Jamaica would "embarrass" itself (i.e., lose face) with the Canadians if too many persons went AWOL.¹³⁹ These subjects also seemed to believe that this would compromise Jamaica's negotiating position, since they specifically referenced their fears that Jamaicans would lose precious farm work slots. One subject argued that law-abiding Jamaicans had suffered because of the generally poor reputation of Jamaicans overseas and MOL had an obligation to prevent persons from going overseas who would further contribute to this negative perception.

f. *Concluding Thoughts*

Generally, subject interviews support the notion that legal rules are influential in a formalistic sense, but more importantly, that they are mediated by community norms. Community norms are influential, independent of their relationship to formal legal rules. While it is debatable whether many of the sources of obligation are in fact "law," they are clearly important in the subjects' decision-making matrices. Both formal and

punishment that deportation should at least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment). See generally Annmarie Barnes, *Transnational Dislocations: The Use of Deportation as Crime Control* (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).

138. Programme Interviews, *supra* note 112 (subjects include DT, SP).

139. Programme Interviews, *supra* note 112 (subjects include AS, CH, DB, DR, EC, FC, G, H, L, M, P, RB, RH, S, SB, VH). This message is clearly communicated in the MOL's orientation literature. JAMAICAN MINISTRY OF LABOUR, *supra* note 92.

informal sanctions appeared to comport with their notions of just deserts. There are clearly persons who play a disproportionate role in the norm enforcement process. These persons are precisely the persons who have been selected by the MOL to screen, sanction, and generally help ensure compliance.

III. WHY THIS NEW APPROACH WORKS

A. Information Asymmetry

Recall that the primary goal of any immigration law regime is only to admit persons who comport with expressed immigration goals. For guest worker regimes, a primary criterion is short-term tenure. Recall also that typically an applicant's type is not apparent to the screener. Indeed, in some instances, even the applicant may be unaware of her type. Consider, for example, Applicant X who is genuinely unsure whether or not she would prefer to enter the United States for the short term or the long term, but decides to apply for short-term entry. Consider Applicant Y who knows that she wants to enter for the long term but, given her low-skill level, is unable to enter the United States other than as a guest worker. Notably, neither Applicant X nor Applicant Y will reveal her type to screeners, although their motives are completely different. Applicant X is genuinely not in a position to reveal her type, while Applicant Y will not reveal her type since it will undermine her application if she does so.

The controversy surrounding former-President George W. Bush's proposal to revise the guest worker provisions of the INA reflects in part a widespread view that the American government is poorly placed to either access or evaluate *ex ante* predictive information about which types are really short-term. The Jamaica-Canada case study seems to suggest that, by virtue of proximity to their nationals, source-labor countries may be better placed to access information that might be utilized as a proxy for visa compliance. It seems reasonable to generalize this intuition regarding institutional design beyond the particulars of the Jamaica-Canada case study.

Indeed, at first glance, this point seems obvious. After all, the source-labor country is more proximate to the predictive information. But there is a more subtle and arguably more important point. Among high-skilled or high-income applicants who seek to travel to the United States temporarily, there are regularly utilized proxies for short-term type, such as ties to the home country as evidenced by financial assets or professional ties. Low-skilled persons are generally not in a position to provide such evidence. In developing countries such as Jamaica, where informality is pervasive in institutions, source-labor governments are better placed to identify proxies for short-term type and to evaluate this proxy information.

For example, in the Jamaican context, MOL officials favor applicants with a history of agricultural work and show a particular preference for

small farmers who work on their own farms. Successful operation of one's own farm is taken to be a proxy for short-term type. Since the formal system of land titling is poor, it is generally not realistic to expect farmers to provide documentary evidence that they own farms, much less independent evidence that they operate such farms.

This is where insiders, who are the subject of the next section, become critical.¹⁴⁰ Although applicants may not have independent documentation, through insiders, MOL officials are able to access communal networks, which allow them to audit applicants' contentions that they work their own farms. Moreover, references from insiders serve as testimonials to character. These are essentially substitutes for more formal proxies of home-country ties, which the United States is far worse placed to either access or evaluate.

B. *Insiders*

Notably, the program's results appear to be at least partially contingent on the utilization of recommenders who have close ties with a network of persons in rural communities and are in a position to evaluate and share with the authorities their evaluations of visa applicants. In one sense, this finding is unremarkable. These persons appear to be prototypical insiders, in that they have access to inside information that is valuable but is not readily available to others. They have been incentivized by the government to share such information.

Yet, while it is technically accurate to characterize community leaders as insiders, this term does not begin to capture the full extent of the role of community leaders. The government has ongoing relationships with guest workers, which are mediated at least partially through the community leaders. Community leaders play a critical compliance-maintenance role through their ongoing relationships, which allows them to monitor persons whom they have recommended. Moreover, when persons defect, they play a role in sanctioning. As such, the leaders' activities arguably have penumbra deterrence effects. Through their activities, the United States appears to have simultaneously benefited from an outsourcing of the compliance norm-reification function (with its arguably positive effects on visa-compliance rates).

As such, given the ongoing mediating relationships provided by community leaders, they are prototypical intermediaries in trust.¹⁴¹ A striking feature of the inquiry is that both administrator and guest worker interviewees noted that the program will not generally take persons from

140. Insiders are referred to as intermediaries in trust in the next section.

141. The concept of an intermediary in trust is captured in the following: Suppose Party A and Party B are considering a relationship that will be based at least partially on trust but have no reason to trust each other. A and B may be willing to enter into such a relationship if there is an intermediary (Party C) with whom they both have a trusting relationship (that is, A comes to trust B because both A and B trust C). See COLEMAN, *supra* note 75, at 180-85.

particular communities if they do not have an effective intermediary in this community. The rationale for this institutional design choice was that community leaders play a much broader role than simply information gathering and evaluation. Interviewees also emphasize their role as the guardians and enforcers of compliance norms, which is the subject of the next section.

C. Intermediaries in Trust as Guardians of Compliance Norms

1. Connecting the Ethnographic Research to the Theory

There is a long-standing, expansive, and sometimes unwieldy inquiry into the impact of norms on law abidance arising from interdisciplinary studies of law, anthropology, sociology, and economics.¹⁴² Like much of the law and norms literature, the evidence here cited is largely illustrative and qualitative rather than systematic and quantitative. Although the debate about what is “legal” is beyond the scope of this Article, subjects feel obligated to follow certain rules, irrespective of formal legal arrangements, because of an internalized moral commitment or fear of informal sanctions. They understand that these obligations derive not only from the immigration laws of the labor-importing country (and the corresponding formal sanctions), but also from informal bilateral obligations, rules formulated under source-country administrator discretion, and rules enforced by community-level leaders. The range of sources of “law” (beyond formal enforceable Canadian and Jamaican law) strengthens not only the legitimacy of law, but also compliance with law. Of all of these sources, communal norms appear to be most influential, since subjects understand them to be constitutive. Communal norms are clearly deeply intertwined with perceptions of legal obligation.

For reasons of analytical simplicity, this Article distinguishes between two sets of norms. It appears that there are a group of norms, which are complementary and which are broadly sympathetic to compliance. I refer to these in shorthand as compliance norms. Simultaneously, it also appears that there are a group of norms that are in tension with the first set of norms

142. For excellent summaries of the anthropological and sociological contributions to the norms literature, see MOORE, *LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY*, *supra* note 76. See also ABEL, *supra* note 76; Robert C. Ellickson, *A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control*, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1987); Robert C. Ellickson, *Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County*, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). Richard McAdams's article contains a discussion of the secondary economics-influenced norms literature. See Richard H. McAdams, *The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms*, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 339–50 (1997); see also ERIC A. POSNER, *LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS* (2000); Robert Cooter, *Expressive Law and Economics*, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, *The New Chicago School*, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, *The Regulation of Social Meaning*, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 962–91 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, *Social Meaning and Social Norms*, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, *Social Norms and Social Roles*, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). For an example of norms enthusiasm in the criminal context, see Kahan, *supra* note 58.

and are broadly dismissive of compliance. I refer to these as noncompliance norms. However, in a complex social world, we may reasonably intuit that norms are inevitably fluid, contested, complex, and at times even contradictory. The experiences of the subjects confirm this intuition. Subjects' decision making becomes especially complex when norms cut in different directions.

Surprisingly, immigration law appears largely untouched by the norms scholarship in any of its manifestations. The following section argues that the proposal is effective partly because institutions have been designed to grant esteem so as to leverage the power of intermediaries in trust to augment norms and, in so doing, increase the likelihood of visa compliance.

2. The Role of Intermediaries in Trust in Granting Esteem and Buttreasing Norms

McAdams contends that "the initial force behind norm creation is the desire individuals have for *respect* or *prestige*, that is, for the relative *esteem* of others."¹⁴³ Individuals care about how they are evaluated not in the abstract but in relation to others, and, as such, the competition for esteem is inherently relative. Interviews with subjects confirm the importance of the MOL's nomination/referral system, which identifies participants by privileging particular categories of recommenders. It is not coincidental that the screening function has been partially delegated to these community leaders. They are effective screeners at least partly because, as intermediaries in trust, they care about the esteem in which they are held by government and the larger community. Moreover, they play a critical role in granting esteem within their communities. Notably, some subject interviewees expressed the view that their own prioritization of visa compliance was driven at least partially by the need to avoid disapproval (which, of course, is the converse of the competition for approval) from their recommenders.

These intermediaries are persons who are not only influential in the community, but who also independently experience intrinsic rewards in learning about these norms and spreading them.¹⁴⁴ For example, clergy, who presumably experience intrinsic rewards in identifying and articulating norms in their sermons, often play this role.¹⁴⁵ The same is true of social workers, justices of the peace, and so forth. These persons are analogous to those who are known in the norms literature as mavens,¹⁴⁶ namely, persons

143. McAdams, *supra* note 142, at 342.

144. The sociology literature refers to these persons as "intermediaries in trust." See generally COLEMAN, *supra* note 75, ch. 8.

145. For example, some interviewees cited the importance of religious leaders and coaches in guiding their decision making more generally, and in this area in particular.

146. Malcolm Gladwell has offered a theory of how fads reach a tipping point and then cascade. MALCOLM GLADWELL, *THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE* 140–46 (2000). In Gladwell's terminology, a "maven" finds her participation in the norm-generation process intrinsically rewarding and is incentivized to learn about

who exercise particular sway in the norm-generation process.¹⁴⁷ When persons who have been nominated by these mavens go AWOL or engage in criminal offenses, the government officials discount future recommendations from these mavens and, in rare instances, prevent them from providing further recommendations. In so doing, the officials deny these community members access to the program for a limited period. Therefore, the government incentivizes mavens to screen carefully and to be judicious guardians of the norms that they have played a role in either generating or articulating. These mavens appear to be prototypical governmental advisors in that they interface with the MOL on behalf of potential guest workers from their communities. Although they do not act as guarantors in the conventional sense, if their advice proves to be faulty, they do experience the following critical loss, namely, credibility.¹⁴⁸ This has significant implications for the ability of mavens to credibly lobby the government on behalf of future potential guest workers.¹⁴⁹

The critical point is that competition for esteem plays a significant role at all levels of the process. First, recommenders are competing for esteem from the government. Notably, when Jamaican authorities discount the references of recommenders (when AWOL rates become too high), they are essentially “dressing-down” persons of standing in their communities and, in so doing, publicly questioning the value of their judgments. Second, guest workers are competing for esteem from recommenders. Third, guest workers are competing for esteem within their communities. Although guest workers command esteem in their communities (as “man a yard,” or

emerging norms and then share that knowledge freely with others. As such, information is spread widely and at a low cost. *Id.* at 62. A “connector,” on the other hand, contributes to the norm-generation process simply by virtue of her large number of personal contacts and relationships that allows her to “connect” to large numbers of persons. *Id.* at 38. Gladwell’s argument is that fads spread through mavens and connectors until they reach a “tipping point.” *Id.* at 255–56. This argument clearly has implications for the norm-generation process. See also Randal C. Picker, *Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms*, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (1997) (developing game theoretic models of normative cascades); Sunstein, *supra* note 142, at 929–30 (on the role of norm-entrepreneurs).

147. These persons are referred to in the law review literature utilizing a variety of terms. For example, Cass Sunstein uses the term norm entrepreneurs to speak of actors who promote the change of norms. Sunstein, *supra* note 142. Robert Ellickson utilizes a variety of terms to distinguish between the differing roles of those who supply and enforce new norms. See Robert C. Ellickson, *The Market for Social Norms*, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 10–12 (2001). For example, “change agents” are relatively early suppliers and enforcers of new norms. *Id.* Within change agents, Ellickson distinguishes among several categories of persons, including self-motivated leaders, norm entrepreneurs, and opinion leaders. *Id.*; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, *Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks*, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, *A Social Networks Theory of Privacy*, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005).

148. As James Coleman notes, “the advisor’s only stock in trade is the credibility of his advice, and if his advice proves incorrect, his loss is in the trustworthiness of his judgment in the eyes of those he has advised.” COLEMAN, *supra* note 75, at 181.

149. As such, although they do not experience the financial loss typically associated with a guarantor, they do experience loss in their primary currency, namely, credibility, and the loss is nevertheless significant.

"big man," in Jamaican parlance), this esteem is highly contingent on the guest workers' ability to play a continuing role as providers.

It is plausible that the granting of esteem is bidirectional between recommenders and guest workers (that is, just as recommenders can deny esteem to guest workers, guest workers can deny esteem to recommenders if, through poor judgment, they compromise their ability to deliver future recommendations to community members). This raises an obvious question. Is the denial of esteem also bidirectional between guest workers and government and between recommenders and government? Theoretically, the denial of esteem may be bidirectional between guest workers and the government and between recommenders and the government. Yet, as a practical matter, guest workers and recommenders appear to lack tangible mechanisms of denying esteem to the MOL officials if they make unfair judgments or if they, through their own poor screening, compromise the overall program, since the Jamaican Prime Minister or Cabinet appear unlikely to overturn MOL decisions. However, guest workers and recommenders do, in fact, have a mechanism of denying esteem since the Minister, the most senior official at the MOL with administrative responsibility, is an elected official. Indeed, the voting booth may represent the ultimate mechanism of denying esteem. As such, the denial of esteem may theoretically also be bidirectional between guest workers and the government.

3. Setting the Framework for Government Intervention

Interviewees suggested that visa-compliance norms were not prioritized in the broader population and specifically among "town" people. There is convincing evidence that historically visa-compliance norms have not been influential in the context of the broader Jamaican society and more specifically in the urban communities that comprise over half of the population.¹⁵⁰ This evidence arises from a variety of sources, including more generally sociohistorical studies of Jamaican attitudes to offenses committed overseas including immigration offenses. Indeed, one commentator utilizes the term "normative inversion" to capture the

150. The anthropologist of law, Sally Merry, has contended that lawmaking in ex-colonial societies remains deeply influenced by a colonial infrastructure, and the purpose that law had served in such an infrastructure, namely, policing social boundaries, has undermined the legitimacy of law in the wider population. See Sally Engle Merry, *The Criminalization of Everyday Life*, in *EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES* 14 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). It is in this broader historical context that the Jamaican attitudes toward law abidance generally have been contextualized. While there has not been comprehensive survey data on Jamaican attitudes toward law abidance, there is extensive evidence that lawmaking suffers from a legitimacy gap in urban communities, which manifests itself at least partly in dismissive attitudes toward law abidance. See generally ANTHONY HARRIOTT, *POLICE AND CRIME CONTROL IN JAMAICA: PROBLEMS OF REFORMING EX-COLONIAL CONSTABULARIES* (2000); see also DENIS BENN, *THE CARIBBEAN—AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 1774–2003* (2004); GORDON K. LEWIS, *MAIN CURRENTS IN CARIBBEAN THOUGHT: THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CARIBBEAN SOCIETY IN ITS IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS, 1492–1900* (1983); BRIAN MEES, *NARRATIVES OF RESISTANCE: JAMAICA, TRINIDAD, THE CARIBBEAN* (2000).

"incongruence between social and legal definitions of some categories of crime."¹⁵¹ This manifests itself in a broader tendency to exempt persons who have committed crimes overseas (including immigration-related crimes), which result in deportation, from negative moral judgments, since their activities are justified as entrepreneurial attempts to survive in a difficult economic climate.¹⁵² Indeed, visa noncompliance was viewed as a relatively benign activity because it was not perceived as compromising a person's abilities to enter into the cooperative contractual arrangements that are necessary for economic survival. (Indeed, administrators noted that many persons justified their visa noncompliance as a mechanism of ensuring their continuing ability to provide for their families economically.)¹⁵³

Some interviewees contend that these attitudes manifest themselves in evidence of noncompliant behavior overseas. In the absence of comprehensive research, some preliminary indicators are in order. Jamaica has the highest per capita rate of deportation from both Canada and the United States in the world,¹⁵⁴ and a recent study provides further preliminary evidence that high proportions of Jamaicans commit immigration-related offences in the United States.¹⁵⁵ Unlike other Latin American countries whose nationals have high rates of immigration-related offences, very few Jamaicans enter as undocumented aliens.¹⁵⁶ Virtually all Jamaicans who enter the United States are visa recipients who have presumably been prescreened.¹⁵⁷ These high rates of visa noncompliance have been a source of ongoing concern to successive governments, who contend that such behavior undermines the likelihood of overseas travel by other Jamaicans and in so doing threatens to compromise remittances,

151. HARRIOTT, *supra* note 150, at xvii. Anthony Harriott's work bears similarities to the landmark ethnographic study that was conducted by Elijah Anderson in Philadelphia. See ANDERSON, *supra* note 13; see also MEEKS, *supra* note 150. Randall Kennedy and Regina Austin have offered comparable arguments to account partially for high levels of crime in American urban centers. RANDALL KENNEDY, *RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW* (1997); Regina Austin, "The Black Community," *Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification*, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769 (1992).

152. HARRIOTT, *supra* note 150.

153. *Id.*

154. Interview with Chief Technical Officer, Ministry of Nat'l Sec., Jam. (Nov. 2007); see also ANNEMARIE BARNES & ANDREA MCCALLA, A STUDY ON CRIMINAL DEPORTATION, PREPARED FOR THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE PLANNING INSTITUTE OF JAMAICA (2006). The figures for the United Kingdom are similarly high.

155. For a broader discussion of high levels of noncompliance by Jamaicans with immigration laws, see Madjd-Sadjadi & Alleyne, *supra* note 83.

156. Jamaica and other Caribbean countries are often referred to as part of the larger Latin American region given their proximity to Latin American neighbors. Other Latin American countries whose nationals appear to have very high rates of noncompliance with immigration laws as indicated by rates of deportation include Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. See David Brotherton, *The Deportees*, 37(2) NACLA REPORT ON THE AMS., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 8, 8-11; Donna DeCesare, *Deported 'Home' to Haiti*, 32(3) NACLA REPORT ON THE AMS., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 6, 6-10.

157. See Madjd-Sadjadi & Alleyne, *supra* note 83.

which play a critical role in the economy.¹⁵⁸ The institutional design innovations discussed here arise in part from a concerted effort to develop a program that screens effectively and holds noncompliant Jamaicans accountable.

In this context, it is significant that this study suggests that, among a certain subset of guest workers, the social meanings attributed to immigration violations are entirely different from the indifference with which they appear to be treated in other sections of the society. Among the subjects in this study, there was no evidence of “normative inversion” as manifested in dismissive attitudes to noncompliant behavior. There was minimal evidence of a tendency to discount the seriousness of going AWOL. Rather, workers were strikingly consistent in their moral condemnation of those who did not comply with visa terms who were alternatively described as “selfish,” “foolish,” and “wutless,” among other condemnatory descriptions. They view their own decisions to comply not just as rational economic decisions, but as evidence of their moral fiber, which distinguishes them from those who go AWOL.

4. Government Signaling Through Institutional Design

There is little doubt that the symbolic meanings attributed to immigration violations are decidedly negative in the communities from which the interview subjects originate. Eric Posner’s account of the development and evolution of norms may be helpful in this instance.¹⁵⁹ Posner prioritizes the link between symbols (and symbolic behaviors) and norms, since “people’s effort to show respect for them [i.e., symbols] lead to significant forms of conformity that can be described as social norms.”¹⁶⁰ Posner utilizes a model in which persons engage in symbolic behaviors to encourage others to cooperate with them by sending signals. Prioritizing a particular norm allows a person to signal to the community that he is a “good type” who seeks to enter into a cooperative relationship.

Although sending a signal entails costs, those who value the gains that are associated with cooperative relationships will invest in sending signals to provide evidence of their “type.” If enough persons invest in sending signals, the result is a signaling equilibrium, in which several outcomes may occur. For example, the good types may consistently send signals and thus

158. A former Jamaican Prime Minister has argued that this tendency to discount deportation-related offenses has had profoundly negative implications for Jamaica’s social and economic development. See Honorable Prime Minister P. J. Patterson, Address at the Opening of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (July 4, 2004), available at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/speeches/25hgc_patterson.jsp; see also Marc Lacey, *No Paradise for Criminals Deported to Jamaica*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, at A13; Most Honorable Portia Simpson-Miller, Jamaican Prime Minister, Keynote Address to the Conference on the Caribbean, Wash., D.C. (June 19, 2007) (on file with author).

159. Eric A. Posner, *Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law*, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998).

160. *Id.* at 767.

match up with other good types (thus distinguishing themselves from the bad types, who choose not to send the signal). There may also obtain instead a "pooling equilibrium" in which both good types and bad types have similar assessments of the relative costs and gains associated with signals. As such, either all choose to invest or all choose not to invest in signaling, leading to no real differentiation between the types.

A state seeking to influence norms has several choices, which appear to have been utilized in varying degrees by the Jamaican officials. By subsidizing the cost of sending a "good type" signal and increasing the cost of sending a "bad type" signal, the state can augment the good signals, which accompany compliance norms. Indeed, this is precisely what the Jamaican government did by providing clear esteem-based (and by extension, economic) benefits to "good types," and simultaneously highlighting the disadvantages of being a "bad type." When persons become guest workers, they significantly improve their economic standing and there are clear spin-off effects for the broader community. By publicly advertising that "good types" may be eligible for a range of benefits (including recognition as recommenders), the government may also have affected the benefits that norm entrepreneurs gained from both sending signals and constructing new signals (that are supportive of visa compliance). Moreover, through communal networks, the government publicizes its knowledge of defectors, while emphasizing that the MOL was likely to look more skeptically at other applicants from the same community. Through such repeated public denunciation of defectors, it appears that the government imposed a real cost on defectors and their families. Government signaling appears to have been particularly influential in certain small rural communities, since it is virtually impossible to keep designation as a "bad type" confidential in these communities.

This governmental action may have had a secondary important impact. The government may have influenced beliefs about the relative prevalence of both good and bad types. Indeed, this may have been reflected in the general view among interviewees that, while there were bad types in other communities, such bad types did not generally belong to their communities. They were generally likely to see their neighbors consistently as "good types."¹⁶¹

161. In so doing, at the risk of stating the obvious, by imposing group accountability rules (even indirectly), the government is also increasing the (perceived) payoff that both senders and receivers will gain from cooperation.

IV. ANSWERING OBJECTIONS: THE *SUI GENERIS*, CORRUPTION AND HALLIBURTON CONCERNS, VERTICAL OUTSOURCING, AND A PROPOSAL

A. *Anticipating Critiques*

This section anticipates a number of critiques. First, the critique might reasonably be made that this case study is *sui generis*. More specifically, Jamaica's small size, and the fact that guest workers originate from homogenous, closely knit rural agricultural communities might undermine the case study's applicability to larger, less tightly knit societies from which many documented and undocumented low-skilled workers in the United States currently originate. The second critique concerns the potential for corruption. Third, the proposal is also susceptible to the critique that it excludes those who are "network poor," namely, those who do not have access either to a community leader or to a broader community of persons with whom they have ongoing relationships who are able to provide testimonials as to their suitability for visas. I include a modified proposal that aims to mitigate this critique.

I refer to the fourth critique succinctly as the Halliburton critique; the term "outsourcing" has taken on a pejorative tone and the proposal is likely to be particularly controversial in the immigration context, especially against a backdrop in which immigration and national security are deeply intertwined. The question necessarily arises: can the United States expect other countries to reliably meet their screening and sanctioning commitments?

1. The *Sui Generis* Critique

Most documented and undocumented low-skilled workers currently originate from communities that are less closely knit within larger societies. Indeed, even within Jamaica, one might have concerns about the applicability of the model outside of rural areas; there are communities with diverse forms of social organizations and differing kinship systems. If this is true within Jamaica, it is even more likely to be true outside Jamaica.¹⁶² The question becomes, to what degree do the results in this Article reflect particular context, circumstance, and culture?

In part, this is an inherent limitation of the case study approach; it is difficult to specify the relative contribution of diverse factors to visa compliance in the context of one case study. Ideally, this concern would be addressed through comparative empirical study of the effectiveness of similar programs in diverse source-labor contexts. In the absence of such

162. Moreover, the success of the program may also be influenced by the close historical relationship between Jamaica and Canada. Both Jamaica and Canada share a commonwealth bond and a history of cooperation arising out of the British colonial experience. This concern ideally would be addressed through comparative empirical study of the effectiveness of similar programs in diverse labor-importing contexts.

work, this section offers some preliminary thoughts in this regard with respect to the applicability of this model to a more diverse range of source-labor communities.

One might begin with the general intuition that the proposal is more likely to be applicable where the source-labor community has conditions which approximate those that exist in rural Jamaican agricultural communities. What would these conditions be? One might intuit that these would include the presence of a sufficiently tight knit source-labor community that allows members a practical mechanism of monitoring the behavior of their peers, a concern among individual members about how they are perceived in relation to other members of the community, and the existence of a mechanism of sanctioning for deviations from generally expected communal standards. The effectiveness of such a program is likely to be further amplified if there is a broader concern about the group's reputation and a perception that the behavior of individual group members has implications for the broader group's reputation.

In the absence of specific comparative work, there is related work from the anthropology and experimental economics literature that might be broadly applicable. These studies address how resource-constrained communities in developing countries solve the social dilemmas that they face, put in place sanctioning systems, and effectively promote cooperation in the absence of law. These generally include risk-pooling arrangements and in particular, common pool resources (CPR) management. More specifically, these social dilemmas range from informal agricultural insurance arrangements to arrangements for monitoring access to herding grounds for cattle to rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs).¹⁶³

Although the Jamaica-Canada program has not been viewed in this Article through the analytical lens of risk-pooling arrangements, this project could also be conceptualized in this manner. As is the case in the microcredit context, where group members carry the risk of loan default (as opposed to only the individual borrower as in conventional banking arrangements), similarly, community members carry the risk of visa overstay (as opposed to only the individual guest worker).¹⁶⁴ Similarly, this project may also be viewed through the analytical lens of CPR if the communal reputation is conceptualized as a CPR on which an aspiring

163. For a good summary of some of the research in this area, see Abigail Barr, Marleen Dekker & Marcel Fafchamps, *Risk Sharing Relations and Enforcement Mechanisms* (Ctr. for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper No. 2008-14, 2008), available at <http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/wps-list.html>. For a good summary of the literature on Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) see Timothy Besley et al., *The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations*, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 386 (Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Roy eds., 2001).

164. For a discussion of microcredit in the context of the risk-pooling literature, see BEATRIZ ARMENDÁRIZ DE AGHION & JONATHAN MORDUCH, *THE ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE* 147-77 (2005).

guest worker may draw to attain a visa, and which she will deplete by defection.¹⁶⁵

While a detailed discussion of specific studies is beyond the scope of this Article, in broad outline, the studies generally investigate the prevalence of cooperative behavior in risk pooling and CPR management. In diverse poor communities in developing countries, members display a willingness to behave in a prosocial manner and reward others who do, while punishing those who do not, even when such actions are costly to themselves. Generally, these arrangements are broadly characterized by informal yet clearly defined rules, effective monitoring (and occasionally specific designation of monitors), accountability of monitors to the broader community, graduated sanctioning that is proportionate to the degree of transgression, and clear conflict resolution mechanisms.¹⁶⁶

One approach to resolving questions of broader applicability of this proposal may be to find communal contexts in which broadly comparable arrangements already exist. It may then be possible to design guest visa programs that leverage mechanisms of monitoring the behavior of members that are already in place. It is not possible on the current evidence to say that the model is broadly applicable. It is simply possible to say that, intuitively, it would seem reasonable to presume that the model has some broader applicability beyond the particulars of this study if the source-labor communities share similar characteristics.¹⁶⁷

2. The Corruption Concern

The corruption concern is not unique to this proposal. In any visa-allocation program, typically, the number of qualified applicants will exceed the number of visa slots. Therefore, the potential rent-seeking problems are apparent in that community leaders will have powerful incentives to choose from within the group of qualified applicants those who are willing to offer bribes. A community leader may still be able to keep her AWOL rate low, thus assuring that she will retain her positions,

165. The most comprehensive discussion of Common Pool Resources (CPR) including an introduction for the nontechnical reader is contained in ELINOR OSTROM, *GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION* 30–33 (1990).

166. A good summary can be found in *FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY: ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS AND ETHNOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE FROM FIFTEEN SMALL-SCALE SOCIETIES*, (Joseph Henrich et al. eds., 2004).

167. Simultaneously, there may be differences in the applicability of this model to different societies, depending on a variety of factors including the extent to which it is possible to maintain close communal ties even when guest workers leave their communities of origin for temporary periods to work; the pervasiveness of reputational effects across state lines; and the credibility and effectiveness of the state as an actor in the communities from which guest workers originate. This leads to the intuition that, even as the model may have broader applicability, it may need to be modified to suit particular society-specific contexts.

and earn some extra income in the process. So, she might figure, why not take a bribe?¹⁶⁸

In this particular proposal, the corruption concern is arguably augmented. How so? This project has significant analogies to a series of recent innovations among development practitioners that seek to leverage social networks to collateralize assets that had previously been unattainable by poor communities. For example, recent initiatives by the World Bank to provide poor communities access to external insurance and credit markets through microinsurance and microcredit initiatives have been formulated in precisely this vein.

As development practitioners have noted, projects that are reliant on leveraging social networks are particularly prone to corruption because they are necessarily reliant on friendships and familial relationships.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, the tendency to corruption may be amplified if there is a disproportionate reliance on local elites in decision making. Making a related point, one commentator has written, "[T]here is an important cultural component to corruption. Many corrupt officials do not seek to transgress social rules; rather, the rules of their society demand that they help family and friends *before* they see to the general public interest. In many ways, nepotism is one of the most natural of human impulses."¹⁷⁰ This project suffers from the same deficiency that characterizes projects that are similarly reliant on social networks. Social networks can easily morph into a basis for nepotism, corruption, and other forms of rent-seeking behavior. This is particularly true where resources of social capital are spread unequally so that certain group members have preferred access to valuable goods and information.

In recognition of the corruption concern that inevitably accompanies programs that leverage social networks for developmental ends, the World Bank has developed a list of institutional design and administrative reform recommendations. These include public articulation of the resources to be allocated and the persons responsible for allocating them, confidential toll-free reporting hotlines for persons on the ground, protections for whistleblowers, clearly articulated penalties for transgressions, and speedy and transparent prosecutions. It would appear that these recommendations would also be applicable in this context, and they have been at least partially adopted in the Jamaica-Canada program. Transparency has turned

168. For a general discussion of the implications of corruption in guest worker programs see PRITCHETT, *supra* note 7.

169. This point is particularly well made in the concluding chapter of Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van Bastelaer, *Conclusion: Measuring Impact and Drawing Policy Implications*, in *THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT* 341, 341–50 (Christiaan Grootaert & Thierry van Bastelaer eds., 2002).

170. Francis Fukuyama, Address at the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean: Towards a New Paradigm, Santiago, Chile (Sept. 24–26, 2001), in Francis Fukuyama, *Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda*, in *SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOWARDS A NEW PARADIGM* 45 (Raúl Atria et al., compilers (2004)).

out to be a particularly helpful preventative measure. In so doing, the Canadians have essentially made persons on the ground who are seeking access to visas their allies in preventing corruption.

More specifically, the Jamaican government publicly advertises precisely how many visas are available during each agricultural season and the persons who will be providing the recommendations for participation. This provides persons on the ground with an imperfect, but nevertheless rough, mechanism of assessing how many persons they can expect to travel from their own community and whether the persons who are actually selected coincide with their rough sense of who is appropriate. In so doing, not only are they incentivized to watch the authorities, they are also properly armed with information. In this context, while it is difficult to prevent occasional instances of nepotism at the periphery of the program, it would be difficult for larger scale institutionalized corruption to take root.¹⁷¹

3. The Exclusion of Out-Groups

Ties of kinship bind, but they also exclude.¹⁷² A common critique of this proposal is that it excludes those who are "network poor," namely, those who do not have access either to a community leader or to a broader community of persons with whom they have ongoing relationships and whom they might be able to ask to provide testimonials as to their reliability. If the sociological literature that investigates the pervasiveness of what is alternatively characterized as "social capital" or "social networks" in diverse poor communities is any guide, this is not likely to be the primary concern.¹⁷³ Because the poor in diverse societies invariably

171. Officials acknowledged a concern among Canadians that visa slots might be awarded to politically connected persons, particularly if visas are construed by partner government officials as a form of political patronage to reward loyal constituents. Simultaneously, officials and guest workers expressed the view that the program appeared to be free of the corruption that characterized other guest worker programs such as the *Bracero* program. In an effort to maintain this record, officials argued that the bilateral agreements should institutionalize the obligations to publish the numbers of visas available and persons responsible for visa allocation, as well as the informal monitoring arrangements by Canadian embassy officials "on the ground" in Jamaica. Officials cited the widely publicized conviction of a minister and permanent secretary who were found to be accepting bribes for placements in the program as evidence of the commitment to nip any problems in the bud. For details of this conviction, see *JAG Smith Loses Appeal*, DAILY GLEANER (Jam.), Oct. 28, 1992, at A2; Barbara Gayle, *Smith's Sentence Reduced*, DAILY GLEANER (Jam.), Oct. 9, 1990, at A1.

172. Social networks can easily morph into a basis for discrimination. The reader should be aware that this is among the questions of justice I raised in footnote 3, which will be the subject of a later paper. In recognition of the discrimination concern that inevitably accompanies programs that leverage social networks for developmental ends, the World Bank has also developed a list of institutional design and administrative reform recommendations. These include the enactment and enforcement of antidiscrimination rules, but also in limited circumstances, the enactment and enforcement of "affirmative discrimination" rules to mandate the inclusion of historically excluded minorities in these programs.

173. This point is particularly well made in *THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN DEVELOPMENT*, *supra* note 169, at 1-15.

have access to a plethora of intertwining relationships that render them “network rich,” the issue is not likely to be one of network poverty. Rather the issue is that certain networks are privileged in relation to others. Certain “in-groups” are able to disproportionately command access to valuable goods and monopolize information and in so doing undermine access for those who are not members of the “in-groups.” If these “in-groups” are able to leverage their privileged access to other resources to give them disproportionate access to visa-allocation networks, this highlights a potential deficiency of the proposal. This section proposes a modification to mitigate this deficiency.

a. *A Modified Proposal: Self-Help Visa Groups*

Persons should be allowed to form what I term “self-help visa groups” (SHVG). These groups are self-selecting entities in which members bear the risk of default by other members. More specifically, the penalty in the event of default by a particular group member will be a time-limited bar on visa applications for members of the SHVG. Through this modification, a person seeking access to a visa need not necessarily develop a relationship even indirectly with a community leader who is a visa screener. She simply needs to find other persons who are similarly interested in applying for visas and who have sufficient information about the fellow visa applicants that they are willing to put their own visa prospects on the line.

In order to sharpen the incentives for group members to audit and monitor their fellow group members, groups should only be allowed to apply for visas if they are able to meet certain conditions.¹⁷⁴ First, they

174. The background to this suggested modification is as follows: one successful Indian microcredit program does not allow group borrowers to access external credit unless they have previously demonstrated that they have successfully operated a group in which members bear the risk of default by other members. More specifically, persons are only able to borrow if they have previously been members of ROSCAs. For a summary of the program, see Kumar Aniket, *Self Help Group Linkage Programme: A Case-Study* (Nov. 15, 2006), available at www.aniket.co.uk/research/casestudy.pdf. There is an extensive literature from the microcredit context as to whether low-risk participants end up with low-risk participants as partners, whether high-risk participants end up with high-risk participants as partners, and so forth. For a good summary of this literature, see Ghatak, *supra* note 73.

A brief background on ROSCAs is as follows. ROSCAs provide a systematic mechanism of pooling resources within a broad group of neighbors and friends. ROSCAs share certain basic characteristics that are summarized as follows: a group of people gather on a regular basis to meet; at each meeting each of the members contributes a fixed amount to a common pot; at each meeting, this pot is given to one member of the group who is determined either randomly or through a bidding process; this member is then unable to receive the pot in future meetings, although she is still obliged to contribute. This process is repeated until each member has received the pot, completing a cycle, which may or may not begin again. ROSCA participation entails costs since members forgo the flexibility of saving on their own, do not receive interest, and undertake the risk of default by other members. Nevertheless in environments in which access to financial mediation is poor, individuals join ROSCAs rather than saving on their own as a mechanism of quickly financing the purchase of durable goods, as a commitment device against self-control problems or as an informal mechanism of insurance (since some ROSCAs permit members to take loans against the pot).

must be able to provide preexisting evidence that they have previously functioned as a group in which individuals have borne the risk of default of other members (whether that be in relation to a loan, insurance payments, etc.). This innovation is based on a similar modification in the microfinance context. For example, in one successful microfinance program, groups are only able to access external credit if they can provide evidence that they have previously functioned as a group in which individual members bear the risk of default by other members.¹⁷⁵ Such groups would include informal or mutual financing arrangements that are already pervasive in many developing countries. More specifically, persons might be eligible if they have previously been members of ROSCAs, a form of informal financial mediation, iterations of which have been found worldwide.

Second, at least in the program's initial stages of administration (certainly until it is possible to generate data sets on visa-compliance levels that suggest that this condition should be relaxed), ideally all group members should receive visas simultaneously and travel to similar regions.

ROSCAs are arguably the most pervasive form of informal financial mediation among the poor in developing countries. Indeed, a broad range of studies indicate that they are among the most prevalent forms of informal financial mediation in developing countries. They are also prevalent among recent migrants in developed countries. One study found that at least half of the rural residents in Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, Nigeria, Liberia, and Togo were participants in ROSCAs. Another study found that fully 20% of the bank deposits in the Indian state of Kerala derived from ROSCAs. Yet another study found that roughly 20% of Taiwanese had been ROSCA participants. There is also evidence that ROSCAs are popular in Mexico and Chile. Sixty-five percent of Jamaicans surveyed were currently participants in a ROSCA. A good summary is contained in AGHION & MORDUCH, *supra* note 164, ch. 3. The Jamaican figures are contained in Claremont Kirton, *Rotating Savings and Credit Associations in Jamaica: Some Empirical Findings on Partner*, 45 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 195 (1996); Sudhanshi Handa & Claremont Kirton, *The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations: Evidence from the Jamaican "Partner,"* 60 J. DEV. ECON. 173 (1999).

175. In the Indian microcredit program, prior to applying for access to external financing, group members must successfully demonstrate that they belong to a ROSCA that has been operational for some specified time period. There are strong incentives to monitor compliance in ROSCAs since early recipients of the pot can always default, leaving later recipients holding the bag. Indeed, it is for this reason that ROSCAs are often found to include a formal meeting component; this provides an institutionalized mechanism of members "checking up" that other members are on track to meet their financial commitments. For a summary of the program, see Aniket, *supra* note 174.

A further innovation is that groups are only permitted to borrow if their ROSCA has been modified from simply a saving ROSCA to a saving and borrowing ROSCA. The primary innovation is that the savings are allowed to accumulate with a moratorium on any member taking from the pot for some specified time period. After this time period, members are permitted to borrow against it in accordance with a tightly structured repayment schedule, with the interest being shared equally among all ROSCA members. If payments are late, all members suffer reduced earnings on their contribution to the pot. In the early stages of a group's life, given the small size of the overall pot, borrowing is generally sequential with the order of borrowing determined by a consensus among the group members. A ROSCA is deemed to be successful when all members receive their portion of the pot, with no default by early takers of the pot. Successful participation in a ROSCA is evidence that members have successfully screened their fellow group members and audited their compliance.

This allows the program to screen more effectively for those who have made a credible commitment—specifically those for whom visas are valuable and default costs are real. Notably, many informal mechanisms of group saving or borrowing that are pervasive in developing countries (including ROSCAs) include regular meeting components. Through these meetings, group members are actively involved in monitoring their neighbors, which allows them to anticipate—and sometimes head off—default if members run into financial trouble. The aim of the proposed condition that SHVG members receive visas and travel together is to approximate similar conditions. Given that this program does not depend on the oversight of a village “elder,” the intuition is that group members are more likely to be able to prevent default if they are able to actively monitor their peers in person (as opposed to cross-border monitoring).

B. *Laying the Groundwork for the Halliburton Critique*

Any proposal that advocates even the partial outsourcing of screening and sanctioning functions, which have traditionally been considered to be at the core of the immigration power, is likely to be controversial. In the larger public political discourse, opponents of such measures point to what they perceive to be instances of “outsourcing” in immigration policy, which proved unsuccessful.¹⁷⁶ For example, to the extent that the government has at least partially “outsourced” the postentry verification of immigration documentation to employers, this system appears to have been largely ineffective.¹⁷⁷

This critique implicates the potential disadvantages of relying on an entity external to the United States as even a partial substitute for performing functions that have traditionally been conceived as constituting the core of the immigration power. Loosely speaking, in the model proposed, the source-labor government would be acting as an “agent” for the American government. In turn, the community-level screeners would be acting as agents for the source-labor government. I use the term agent broadly to mean any relationship in which one entity engages another to perform a service under circumstances that involve delegating some discretion over decision making to the service performer.¹⁷⁸ In light of the

176. The CNN commentator, Lou Dobbs, is particularly well-known for a pejorative use of the term outsourcing generally and, more specifically, in the immigration context. See Borowitz, *supra* note 53. For a similarly critical use of the term outsourcing in the immigration context in congressional testimony, see *Implementing the 9/11 Act Mandates for Enhancing the VISA Waiver Program: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism*, 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Douglas E. Lavin, Regional Vice President, International Air Transport Association).

177. See Jacoby, *supra* note 29.

178. In the economics literature, an agency relationship is defined as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, *Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure*, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). This

likely skepticism, an examination of the incentives of the key players to fulfill particular functions is critical to the plausibility of the proposal. The aim of this section is in part to provide a “thin” minimalist model, which abstracts the key features of the program from its “thicker” aspects so as to bring into focus the incentive issue.

1. Breaking Down the Model

In its thicker form, the model involves two levels of vertical outsourcing. First, there is the partial transfer of screening and sanctioning functions from one state to another. The second vertical transfer of responsibilities involves the devolution of such functions down the “food chain” from the source-labor government to community leaders (or “intermediaries in trust” in the model’s thicker version) to individual relationships at the level of the community.

The thickness of the model as it currently stands, with its utilization of two levels of vertical outsourcing and the apparent importance of intergovernmental relationships, may obscure which entities are actually integral to screening and sanctioning. The key entities in the model are those who have not only inside knowledge (which aids in screening), but also individual level relationships (which aid in sanctioning).

More specifically, the persons who have inside knowledge are community members. These persons have individual-level relationships that allow them access to predictive information regarding the likelihood that someone will comply with a visa that is not readily available to others, and an accompanying ability to sanction those who do not comply with rules. The thick model refers to these persons as intermediaries in trust. I will refer to the community-level person with inside information as Actor A.

In a minimalist version of the model, all that is really needed is for an incentive to be created for Actor A to screen. To do so, one could imagine that the model would simply create a mechanism of awarding something of value to Actor A, while simultaneously implicitly creating a sanction by threatening to take this valuable item away.

Consider, for example, that the entity that awards something of value is Actor X. In the thicker model—namely, the Jamaica-Canada program as it currently stands—the Jamaican government performs the function of Actor X. In the thicker model, the mechanism of awarding a prize to Actor A is the official designation by Actor X of Actor A as a person of status in the community. The sanction is implicit in that Actor X may “dress down” Actor A by withdrawing the designation as a person of status. The same

definition is much broader than the common-law definition in which agency is the “fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).

point can be made with respect to sanctioning. Actor A is best placed to sanction her fellow community members because she has the individual-level relationships that can be leveraged to shame or stigmatize a visa violator. Here again, Actor X simply needs to incentivize Actor A to sanction.

There may also be devolution of this process of incentivization “down the food chain” creating a “chain” of incentivization. For example, Actor A may recognize that there is another person with better access to inside information concerning a potential visa recipient. As such, in the same way that Actor X created an incentive for Actor A, Actor A may in turn incentivize Actor B to aid in screening. Of course, Actor B may then engage Actor C, if Actor C has even better access to inside information. The analogous relationship in the thicker model is when the MOL designates a parliamentarian who then designates a local government representative who in turn designates a community-level clergy, with each person having even better access to inside information. Notably, Actor A may also incentivize Actor B (and so on) as an intermediary in the sanctioning process.

Even as there may be a “chain of incentivization,” Actor X need only deal with Actor A, with Actor A assuming responsibility for Actor B (and Actor B assuming responsibility for Actor C, and so on). There are clear analogies to a principal-agency relationship in contract, where Actor X engages Actor A as the general contractor. Actor A may then choose to engage subcontractors, but Actor A retains primary responsibility, and the buck stops with her.¹⁷⁹

2. Outsourcing to a High-Level Governmental Actor

The prospect of the United States dealing with hundreds of screeners (in what can only be described as retail as opposed to a wholesale arrangement) imports extraordinary logistical and political challenges, particularly in a foreign environment.¹⁸⁰ In light of this, it seems reasonable that the United

179. The relationship between Actor X and Actor A calls to mind a classic iterated prisoners' dilemma, in which the game is played repeatedly. In the classic form of a prisoners' dilemma, rational choice leads each of the two players to defect even though each player's individual reward would be greater if she cooperated. As in broader game theory, each player is strictly concerned with maximizing her own payoff; however, one player will always maximize her payoff by defecting, irrespective of what the other player does. As such, cooperation is overwhelmed by defection, so that the resulting equilibrium for the game is for all players to defect. In contrast to a conventional prisoners' dilemma, in which defection is always more beneficial than cooperation, in an iterated prisoners' dilemma, which is played over several games, each player has an opportunity to sanction the other player for prior noncooperative behavior. Cooperation may arise as an equilibrium outcome since the incentive to defect may be outweighed by the threat of sanction. See JOEL WATSON, *STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY* ch. 1 (2002) (providing a good summary for the nontechnical reader).

180. Indeed, there are clear analogies to certain aspects of the United States' current consular relationships. It is precisely such challenges that have led the United States to rely heavily on outsourcing in its overseas consular arrangements. Notably, there is a burgeoning

States would outsource these responsibilities to some sort of high-level actor who functions in a general contractor role and assumes responsibility for the hundreds of other actors who are necessary to this process.

Accordingly, it seems intuitively clear that a high-level actor is necessary to the process, with the United States stipulating certain criteria for this high-level actor to meet. Under a traditional rational choice view, the model would work as long as it is able to create incentives for those with inside information to screen and sanction. While a private actor may be properly incentivized to fulfill this function utilizing particular contractual structures and legal remedies,¹⁸¹ what is less clear is that a government may be so incentivized.

In fact, the incentives to defect may be minimized for a particular type of governmental actor with specific traits that augment the costs of defection. The point is not that a governmental actor may perform this function better than a private sector entity; rather the contention is simply that, for a particular type of governmental entity, the costs of defection may be very high. Given the literature on comparative agency costs in government versus the private sector,¹⁸² it seems counterintuitive to contend (in an environment in which even outsourcing to the private sector is dismissed as a "Halliburton strategy") that a foreign government may be properly motivated to screen. On the contrary, we might think that defection is particularly likely at the end of an outgoing administration (since the reputation costs would be borne by the successor government).

However, under particular conditions, the bilateral arrangements between the United States and another government may approximate a relationship in perpetuity in which the likelihood of cooperation in any given round of the game is high because reputational effects dominate.¹⁸³ This is particularly true with proximate developing countries that have significant economic, social, and national security ties with the United States, which lead to a high degree of interdependence. This high degree of dependence on the United States makes the cost of defection very high. This will undermine the incentive to defect in the final round even if the bilateral arrangement is finite.

literature on the difficulties that the United States has faced in its consular arrangements overseas, in which commentators have noted the difficulties associated with the United States managing myriad retail relationships in a foreign environment. See ZOLBERG, *supra* note 45.

181. Richard Lewis's text contains a good general summary of such measures. See RICHARD LEWIS, *CONTRACT SURETYSHIP: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE* (2000).

182. A good summary of this literature is contained in Andre Shleifer, *State Versus Private Ownership*, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1998). See also generally Ronald A. Cass, *Damage Suits Against Public Officers*, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1164-68 (1981); John C. Jeffries, Jr., *In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983*, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 72, 75-76 (1998); Daryl Levinson, *Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs*, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2002) (acknowledging the difficulties in incentivizing government employees, particularly low-level officials).

183. See WATSON, *supra* note 179, at 29-37, for a good summary for the nontechnical reader.

This point is borne out by an extensive literature on interstate incentives to cooperate, which argues that classical international relations theory has underestimated “the varieties of cooperative behavior possible within . . . a decentralized system.”¹⁸⁴ The contention is that classical international relations theory (with its disproportionate focus on the threat of force in constraining state actions), has not understood “complex interdependence” in interstate relations in which states’ interests are aligned on multiple fronts.¹⁸⁵ For this reason, modern states are less inclined to behave in a noncooperative manner (i.e., defection) than has been traditionally understood. Nowhere is this truer than in relations between proximate developing countries and their more powerful counterparts. While one should resist the temptation to characterize such developing countries as “helpless pawns in the game of international relations,”¹⁸⁶ their “foreign policy and international relations are largely defined by larger, more powerful actors and situations.”¹⁸⁷ The incentive for a small developing country to fulfill contractual arrangements with more powerful partners in any given round (including a final round) is likely to be high because the implicit possibilities of retaliation in multiple arenas is also high.¹⁸⁸

3. Other Reasons for the Utilization of a Government Actor: Government May Be Uniquely Placed to Utilize Esteem-Based Incentives

To this point, in this section, I have utilized the term incentive in the traditional sense, namely, to connote incentives appealing to self-regarding

184. GRAHAM EVANS, *THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS* (2000); Daniel Lutzker, *Internationalism as a Predictor of Cooperative Behavior*, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 426 (1960); Charles G. McClintock et al., *Internationalism-Isolationism, Strategy of the Other Player, and Two-Person Game Behavior*, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 631 (1963); Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Power*, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 163 (1960).

185. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, *POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION* 23 (1977); see also ROBERT O. KEOHANE, *AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY* (1984); Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, *The Promise of Institutional Theory*, 20 INT’L SECURITY 39, 47 (1995).

186. Diana Thorburn, *The “Patch” and the “Backyard”: Caribbean and Pacific Small Islands and Their Regional Hegemons*, 56 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 240, 244 (2007) (discussing SECURITY IN OCEANIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Eric Shibuya & Jim Rolfe eds., 2003)); see also SMALL STATES IN WORLD POLITICS: EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR (Jeanne A. K. Hey ed., 2003).

187. Thorburn, *supra* note 186, at 244.

188. Notably, this is not only the case with Jamaica, but with many other developing countries including the other top eight labor-exporting countries for undocumented aliens to the United States. The other members of the “top eight” are Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. See Brotherton, *supra* note 156, at 8–11. Indeed, multilateral development institutions have noted that developing countries place great stock on the access that their nationals have to developed markets because remittances constitute such a significant percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in so many countries. This is significant because developing countries are aware that their nationals are fungible and can be replaced with nationals from another country in a competitive globalized labor market. For a discussion of the economic impact of remittances and the global competition among countries to provide access to “first world” markets for their nationals so as to augment remittances, see WORLD BANK, *supra* note 7.

preferences.¹⁸⁹ The thick model is premised on the utilization of esteem-based incentives, which are other-regarding.¹⁹⁰ Government officials clearly believe that other-regarding incentives are influential in these communities, and the interviews with subject guest workers appear to confirm this impression. These other-regarding incentives include a desire to be (or to be perceived as) patriotic, communal-minded, or fair. Such incentives are sometimes loosely termed "intrinsic motivation."¹⁹¹ The question arises: what class of incentive might be appropriate for Actor X to offer to Actor A?

My comments in this regard are only preliminary; this is clearly a fertile area for further research. It is noteworthy that all of the Jamaican government officials who were interviewed insisted that financial incentives would not only be inappropriate, but also counterproductive. They clearly distinguished reputational incentives from financial incentives, which were described as crass. Moreover, the concern was that financial incentives might simultaneously be insulting to many community leaders.

This strongly held belief is striking in light of the academic literature that suggests that policies that are designed to exploit self-regarding preferences to achieve public ends may sometimes undermine precisely the public ends that they seek to augment. Surveying the literature, Samuel Bowles has cited repeated instances of such failures when traditional policies that seek to harness self-interest compromise what he terms "the beneficial effects of intrinsic motivation and reciprocity[,] as well as civic virtues such as a concern for fairness and a desire to uphold social norms."¹⁹²

189. An individual's preference scheme is self-regarding if he or she "cares only about the amount of goods and services that he or she consumes." DONALD E. CAMPBELL, INCENTIVES, MOTIVATION AND THE ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION 26 (2006).

190. A definition that succinctly captures "other-regarding" preferences is as follows:

The theoretical literature on other-regarding preferences has focused on three departures from the standard self-interest model. In addition to the material resources allocated to him, a person may also care about: (i) The material resources allocated to other agents in relevant reference group. (ii) The fairness of the behavior of the relevant reference agents. (iii) The "type" of reference agents, i.e., whether the agents have selfish, altruistic, spiteful or fair-minded preferences.

Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, *The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism—Experimental Evidence and New Theories*, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY 616, 619 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006).

191. Samuel Bowles, *Social Preferences and Public Economics: Are Good Laws a Substitute for Good Citizens?*, in SANTA FE INSTITUTE AND UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SIENA 1 (2007).

192. *Id.* Samuel Bowles suggests that the utilization of incentives appealing to self-regarding preferences may pervert intrinsic motivation for myriad reasons, including reasons having to do with how incentives "frame" appropriate behavior (which he refers to in shorthand as "framing"), how incentives communicate "information about intent or type," and how incentives affect perceived "self-determination." *Id.* at 3. With respect to "framing," he notes that "[i]ncentives may signal appropriate behavior[,] shifting the frame from ethical and other-regarding to instrumental and self-regarding." *Id.* Moreover, "because the incentives provide a signal of the cost (to another) of the individual's behavior, . . . self-regarding behavior modified by the incentive would seem appropriate behavior." *Id.*

It is notable that Jamaican government interview subjects believe that similar risks may be present in the Jamaican context. They also believe that, because of their myriad interlocking relationships with community-level screeners, government is uniquely well-placed to utilize esteem-based incentives.

CONCLUSION

Recognizing that modern aliens live increasingly transnational lives, this Article critiques the historical uninational approach to immigration law. The Article posits that the United States should enter into bilateral labor agreements as a mechanism of mitigating the aforementioned asymmetry. Under such an approach, the source-labor country could then leverage its proximity to its nationals to aid in the process of screening and sanctioning. Utilizing group accountability principles, the communities from which guest workers originate, which have access to inside information about potential guest workers, can be incentivized to aid in both the screening and the sanctioning process. In a competitive globalized context in which developing countries prize the access that their nationals have to the American labor market, the repeated game-like nature of their interactions with the United States increases the likelihood that they will meet their screening and sanctioning commitments. Finally, this Article contends that if visa-compliance decisions are norms-based, guest workers are more likely to be compliant if the authorities design legal rules that augment compliance norms that are already present in source-labor communities and incentivize community members to reinforce them.

With respect to "information about intent or type," he notes that "[e]xplicit incentives may provide a negative signal about the principal's type or beliefs, either in the form of lack of concern about the agent's well being or lack of trust." *Id.* Finally, self-regarding incentives may undermine perceived "self-determination" because, "where intrinsic motivation is present, incentives may 'overjustify' the activity and reduce the individual's sense of autonomy." *Id.*

Notes & Observations